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been adapted to specific contexts, and explores some innovations introduced 
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The book includes the formulation of an index which aims to help policy-makers 
and programme implementers clearly identify which elements of school-level 
information can lead to increased accountability and transparency, and, as a 
result, make informed decisions about how to make the best of use SRCs to 
improve integrity in education. 
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5Presentation of the series: Ethics and 
Corruption in Education
Several studies conducted over the last two decades have emphasized the 
negative impact of corruption on the economic, social, and political 
development of countries. Corruption increases transaction costs, reduces 
the efficiency of public services, distorts the decision-making process, and 
undermines social values. Studies have also shown a strong correlation 
between corruption and poverty: Statistical regressions suggest that an 
improvement in the ‘control of corruption’ indicator by one standard 
deviation (two points) is associated with an increase of some $11,000 in 
GDP per capita (Sturm, 2013, in OECD, 2015). Moreover, corruption tends 
to contribute to the reinforcement of inequities by placing a disproportionate 
economic burden on the poor and limiting their access to public services.
As a consequence, fighting corruption has become a major concern for 
policy-makers and actors involved in development. In view of the decrease 
in international aid flows and increasingly stringent conditions for the 
provision of aid – due to growing pressure on public resources within donor 
countries and the pressure exerted by taxpayers on governments to increase 
transparency and accountability in resource management – fighting 
corruption is now regarded as a major priority on the agendas of countries 
and international agencies of development cooperation. The Drafting 
Committee of the World Education Forum expressed this concern in the 
following terms: ‘Corruption is a major drain on the effective use of resources 
for education and should be drastically curbed’ (UNESCO, 2000). In other 
terms, to ‘ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong 
learning’ – the fourth of the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals – the 
issue of corruption must be properly addressed.
A quick review of the literature highlights a number of global and 
sectoral attempts to tackle the issue of corruption. In the social sector, for 
example, several studies have been conducted on corruption in relation to 
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the provision of healthcare services. However, it appears that the education 
sector has not received adequate attention from national education 
authorities and donors, despite numerous grounds for prioritizing the 
challenge of combating corruption in education:
• Public sector reforms aimed at improving governance and limiting 
corruption-related phenomena cannot produce significant results unless 
adequate attention is paid to the education sector, as in most countries 
this constitutes the largest or second-largest public sector in both human 
and financial terms.
• Any attempt to improve the functioning of the education sector to 
increase access to quality education for all will be undermined if 
problems related to corruption, which have severe implications for the 
efficient use of resources and quality of education and school 
performance, are not being properly addressed.
• Lack of integrity and unethical behaviour within the education sector 
are inconsistent with one of the primary aims of education – to produce 
‘good citizens’ respectful of the law, human rights, and equity. They are 
also incompatible with any strategy that considers education as a 
principal means of fighting corruption.
In this context, IIEP launched a research project entitled ‘Ethics and 
Corruption in Education’. Corruption is defined as the systematic use of 
public office for private benefit that results in a reduction in the quality or 
availability of public goods and services. The main objective of this project 
is to improve decision-making and the management of educational systems 
by integrating governance and corruption concerns into methodologies of 
planning and administration of education. More specifically, it seeks to 
develop methodological approaches for studying and addressing the issue 
of corruption in education and to collect and share information on the best 
approaches for promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity in the 
management of educational systems in both developing and industrialized 
countries.
The project includes publications on topics of relevance such as school 
financing, pro-poor education incentives, teacher codes of conduct, textbook 
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production and distribution, and academic fraud. It also includes monographs 
on success stories in improving management and governance, as well as case 
studies that facilitate the development of methodologies for analysing 
transparency and integrity in education management.*
Within this framework, IIEP conducted a study to explore the recent 
development of school report cards and to examine cases in which report 
cards prove especially successful in helping to improve transparency and 
accountability in education systems. The study is based on interviews and 
survey findings from 14 countries where school report cards have been 
implemented over recent years, and compares their design and implementation 
through a series of frameworks. It gauges the settings for school report cards 
through an index of transparency and accountability, and examines their role 
in fighting corruption in the education sector. Finally, it suggests a theory of 
change as well as a checklist to guide future school report card implementation 
with a focus on transparency and accountability issues.
IIEP is very grateful to Xuejiao Joy Cheng and Kurt Moses for their 
valuable insights and would like to thank them accordingly.
   Jacques Hallak** and Muriel Poisson***
*       An information platform entitled ETICO has been created within the framework of the project and can be accessed  
 at: http://etico.iiep.unesco.org.
**      Former IIEP Director
***      Head a.i., Research and Development, IIEP
This study was prepared under the supervision of Muriel Poisson, Head a.i., 
Research and Development, at the UNESCO International Institute for 
Educational Planning (IIEP).
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Glossary of key terms
Accountability: the establishment of clear roles and responsibilities, rules, and 
consequences tied to school quality and management.
Bottom-up process (for school report cards): a process through which the 
collection and distribution of school-level information is initiated at the 
community level.
Formal sanction/rewards model (for school report cards): a model in which 
education authorities use formal sanctions and rewards to establish and 
maintain school accountability. 
Information-for-accountability: ‘The use of information, in and of itself, as the 
instrument of change’ (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011).
Market model (for school report cards): a model in which market incentives 
are used to establish and maintain school accountability. 
Public-participation model (for school report cards): a model in which 
accountability for schools is generated by public participation in school 
monitoring.
School report card: the aggregation of education information on schools, such 
as enrolment, teacher, and student attendance, and students’ academic 
performance at the school level.
Top-down process (for school report cards): a process in which the collection 
and distribution of school-level information is initiated by the central 
authority of a country or jurisdiction.
Transparency: information that is ‘easy to understand and simple to access by 
all stakeholders on all flows of educational resources’ (Hallak and Poisson, 
2007), processes, and outcomes. 
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Executive summary
This publication examines the development of school report cards (SRCs) 
in selected countries around the world, with a particular emphasis on 
developing countries. It is intended to assist policy-makers and programme 
implementers in making informed decisions about how to use SRCs. The 
report includes:
• a review of the existing literature,
• interviews with 22 individuals at various levels of government covering 
different areas of responsibility connected with implementing countries,
• a descriptive summary of 14 countries,
• a summary of structures that can help review efforts undertaken to date,
• a set of newly developed indicators that integrate issues of accountability 
and anti-corruption effectiveness in the interpretation of SRCs,
• selected summaries and suggestions for improvement.
The report builds on a USAID Working Paper developed in 2006 for 
the EQUIP 2 Project (Cameron, Moses, and Gillies, 2006) and examines 
cases in which report cards have proven especially successful in helping to 
improve transparency and accountability in education systems. It presents 
interview and survey findings from 14 countries where SRCs have been 
implemented in recent years, and compares their design and implementation. 
It gauges the settings for SRCs through an accountability and transparency 
index based on the authors’ observations, and examines whether and how 
SRCs can be used as part of the toolkit in the fight against corruption in the 
education sector. Finally, it proposes an implementation framework to help 
improve the delivery of education services and reduce corrupt practices.
Some key highlights are:
• School report cards can be powerful tools to engage communities and 
hold schools accountable for providing students with a high-quality 
education. If the process is inclusive and participatory, SRCs can serve 
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as a unique channel allowing education stakeholders to make more 
informed decisions based on school-level data. 
• Reporting in SRCs appears to be more comprehensive than before. 
More comprehensive models include measuring outputs – a key factor 
in accountability – and parent perception.
• Most countries that appear to be less successful in SRC implementation 
lack a good understanding of SRC standards and what consequences 
can be expected based on SRC results. Most SRCs are missing clear, 
effective accountability measures, as well as clear links to those capable 
of making changes. 
• More systematic efforts to employ SRCs to identify corruption often 
focus on specific areas, such as corruption in finance, teacher behaviour, 
and information systems. 
• The exact relationship between implementation of SRCs and a country’s 
perceived level of education corruption is unclear. A number of 
countries with higher levels of perceived corruption in education are 
among those using more sophisticated SRC approaches. 
• Accountability is a key element in the fight against corruption, and is 
led, in part, by transparency. Three case study areas, namely Indonesia, 
Brazil, and the state of Virginia in the United States, employ a 
combination of transparency and measurable consequences, which 
increase the accountability of schools. 
The report summarizes the following main points and lessons learned 
about SRCs: 
• Little rigorous research to date has been undertaken on results and key 
factors. 
• Pressures in the social sector are prompting stakeholders to demand 
more information about schools and schooling. 
• Increased emphasis on ‘data-driven decision-making’ has led more 
SRCs to emphasize comparisons, often at multiple levels. 
• SRCs are a complex undertaking that depends on multiple factors and 
stakeholders.
• SRCs have the potential to become tools to combat corruption. 
18
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• Formal sanctions help to establish more effective consequences, while 
a participatory approach helps to clarify roles and responsibilities, and 
provides more incentives for all stakeholders to contribute to education. 
Moving forward, the report makes the following suggestions to SRC 
designers and implementers: 
• Create mechanisms to encourage and ensure public discussion of 
information, as such debate has the potential to hold educators 
accountable, even in the absence of harsh sanctions.
• Present SRC data in meaningful ways by incorporating graphic 
elements, as well as comparisons with standards and other schools, and 
within the school over time.
• Distribute information in a timely and relevant manner. 
• Provide school leaders with technical assistance by sharing best practices 
from schools with similar socioeconomic backgrounds or through 
guidance from peers or pedagogical advisors.
• Make community members and local education authorities responsible 
for distributing information on school performance, rather than school 
principals, who may have less incentive.
• Incorporate anti-corruption elements into SRCs, such as sharing 
information on potentially corrupt practices and promoting community 
monitoring and dialogue. 
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Background: The demand for information
The demand for data in the public sector has never been as high as in the past 
decade. Following a wave of democratization in the 20th century, citizens in 
democratic societies have increased the pressure for information (Gaventa 
and McGee, 2013), with the emphasis on accountability in public service 
delivery further propelling the demand for data from public bodies. As 
Gaventa and McGee (2013) point out, the 2004 World Development Report 
highlighted the problem of public service failures and advocated more direct, 
‘short-route’ accountability between service users and their providers. 
Moreover, the United Nations’ ‘data revolution’ report on the impact of the 
Millennium Development Goals notes that, globally, efforts to improve 
data for monitoring and accountability are growing (UN Data Revolution 
Group, 2014). 
At the same time, the amount of information available on a daily basis 
has increased at an exponential rate. One estimate suggests that ‘90% of the 
data in the world has been created in the last two years’ (UN Data Revolution 
Group, 2014). In the public sector, improved legal structures such as the 
establishment of right-to-information laws have empowered citizens to 
inquire about the effectiveness of public service delivery. For example, 
according to an estimate from the World Bank, more than 95 countries have 
established laws guaranteeing citizens’ rights to information from public 
bodies (Lemieux, 2014).
As with other public service sectors, the demand for transparency in 
education has increased correspondingly with the availability of information. 
In countries where considerable progress in education attainment has not 
been matched by a rise in education quality, debate focuses on students’ 
learning outcomes (Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman, 2011). According 
to Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos (2011), the number of low- and middle-
income countries participating in the Trends in International Mathematics 
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and Science Study (TIMSS) increased from 15 in 1995 to 38 in 2011, while 
the number participating in the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) increased from 18 in 2000 to 37 in 2009. The availability 
of international and national student assessment and comparison data helps 
to reveal gaps in education quality and puts pressure on education systems 
to deliver better results. 
In addition, initiatives that promote education accountability – coupled 
with the push for education decentralization and the promotion of school-
based management by multilateral donor agencies such as the World Bank 
– have brought education decision-making closer to communities, parents, 
and students. As these stakeholders become more empowered in school 
monitoring and management, they also demand more information and hold 
education service providers accountable.
School report cards serve as an important means to provide school-level 
information to schools, parents, and communities, which in turn increases 
accountability and transparency in the education system. 
Definition of school report cards
School report cards (SRCs) typically refer to the aggregation of education 
information at the school level. For example, an education system may present 
school-level information in the report card on pupil–teacher ratios, student 
achievement, and teacher absenteeism. SRCs differ from the more prevalent 
education management and information systems (EMIS) reports, which 
typically target education authorities as the main audience and usually 
present education information at a national or regional level. This helps 
education decision-makers to monitor educational progress and outcomes, 
plan budgets, and make informed policies. In contrast, SRCs provide 
education information at a much more decentralized level. Although some 
SRCs include the government as a target audience, they are typically used 
to inform the general public about school performance, so as to enable 
stakeholders to more effectively hold schools and districts accountable for 
education quality. 
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The design and implementation of SRCs varies among countries. They 
can be categorized into multiple types according to different analytical angles. 
For example, SRCs can provide information at the central, regional, or school 
level depending on the body providing the framework for and collecting the 
data. 
Underlying motivation and purpose of SRCs 
SRC efforts are initiated for a host of reasons including political initiatives 
that promote transparency in public service sectors, demands from local 
communities and civic groups, education decentralization processes, and 
donor requirements. They can serve a variety of purposes including increasing 
accountability in the education system, assisting in school planning and 
budgeting processes, providing feedback to administrators and teachers, and 
increasing social participation which can improve civil society.
Format of SRCs 
SRCs are typically organized into one of the following formats: 
• scorecards that show school scores on a numerical or letter scale based 
on a list of pre-determined criteria that represent performance or 
progress;
• school profiles that usually present a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative information that forms an overall picture of school operation 
and quality in a report format;
• school-education index, which presents a composite score based on 
indicators (e.g. student learning outcomes and education efficiency) 
for each school, enabling users to compare schools and assess how a 
school changes over time;
• league tables/school rankings that rank schools from best to worst at the 
national or regional level, based on a set of indicators such as school 
performance on standardized learning assessments. 
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The participatory nature of SRCs
Standardized SRCs present school-level information on a set of indicators 
(usually determined by education experts or authorities) that remain the 
same across schools. Participatory SRCs allow community members to 
determine and assess a set of performance indicators tailored to community, 
parent, and student needs. 
Data sources for SRCs
Data for SRCs can originate from a variety of sources, including EMIS, 
standardized assessments, community monitoring reports, and observations 
from school inspectors and peers.
Content of SRCs
SRCs can contain different types of information, including: 
• school funding levels,
• condition of school facilities,
• teacher qualifications,
• teacher behaviours, 
• school management overviews,
• student learning outcomes.
Comparisons allowed in SRCs
The majority of SRCs have consistent indicators, which allows users to 
compare school performance. This increases competition and social pressure 
for schools to improve. SRCs may include comparisons with a standard, such 
as student achievement results set by the federal government; comparisons 
with other schools in the same locality or schools with similar student 
backgrounds; and year-to-year comparisons of the school itself. 
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Purpose and methodology: Filling the evidence gap
In recent years, research studies have focused increasingly on the effectiveness 
of SRCs. Most of these studies employed randomized controlled trials – the 
‘gold standard’ in evaluation – to gauge the impact of innovative experiments 
in SRCs. However, there remains a lack of information regarding recent 
efforts to implement SRCs in countries around the world. This study was 
conducted to compensate, at least in part, for this evidence gap. It reached 
out to 48 programme implementers, policy researchers, ministry of education 
staff members, and civil society and international organizations from 22 
countries. They helped to identify 14 countries implementing or that have 
recently implemented SRCs.1 It surveyed and/or interviewed2 20 individuals3 
familiar with SRC implementation in these 14 countries.4
Because the use of SRCs is still relatively new, many of the cases 
described in this report have not been rigorously evaluated, and the lessons 
learned rely predominantly on desk review findings and anecdotal evidence. 
However, a series of frameworks was created to compare the motivations, 
purposes, audiences, data sources, and contents of school report cards, and 
country cases were evaluated using an index of transparency and 
accountability. Through the use of these tools the authors hope to provide 
a systematic approach to understanding SRCs. 
Organization of the study
This report is organized into an Introduction and five chapters. Chapter 1 
provides a literature review of the theories and research studies that support 
the potential effectiveness of SRCs, as well as probable reasons for noted 
limitations. Chapter 2 provides an overview of SRC studies in 14 countries 
1 The study covered school report card implementation since 2006, although the majority of cases identified 
commenced implementation from 2010 onward. 
2 Twenty individuals were interviewed, six of whom also filled out surveys. See Annex B for survey questions. 
3 See Annex A for a list of interviewees who provided input to the country case studies.
4 The 14 countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, South Africa, Uganda, and the United States. Argentina and South Africa are not featured in the study as 
these two countries had just started or were about to start implementing school report cards. 
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(see Figure I.1), with a focus on comparison of their purposes, audiences, 
data sources, and contents. Chapter 3 analyses the level of accountability and 
transparency reflected in different SRCs that employ an accountability and 
transparency index. It also presents SRC accountability approaches 
(Table 3.2) and explores country cases that have introduced anti-corruption 
elements into SRC design. Chapter  4 discusses promising elements that 
appear to increase SRC effectiveness and explores similar issues that arise in 
multiple countries. The final chapter combines lessons learned from the 
literature review and the country case studies, and suggests a theory of change, 
as well as a checklist to guide future SRC implementation, with a focus on 
transparency and accountability issues. 
Figure I.1 Featured SRC programmes
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Chapter 1
Literature review of school report cards 
The recent literature offers mixed views and conflicting evidence regarding 
whether and how providing information via school report cards (SRCs) can 
help to transform the education system and bring about positive changes in 
school management and performance. 
1.1 How may information lead to greater accountability? 
There are three main channels through which information may lead to better 
accountability in education systems: the market, formal sanction or rewards, 
and public participation. 
The market
SRCs can serve as a means to increase market competition by providing 
more adequate information about school performance. Market models of 
education are appearing in a variety of countries. For example, the Australian 
government subsidizes private school attendance based on the socioeconomic 
background of students. The subsidy covers 14 per cent to 80 per cent of the 
school costs, and is designed to increase school competition (Ryan and 
Watson, 2009). If parents and pupils can be viewed as ‘consumers’ of 
education services, then more information can help them make better 
informed decisions. With school choice as an enabling factor, information 
availability will create competition in the education marketplace, with schools 
competing for student enrolment and income by improving student learning 
outcomes (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011). 
In the United States, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) discovered that 
providing information on student test scores to low-income parents enabled 
them to make informed school choices, which resulted in improved student 
test scores. Attending a school with test scores that average one standard 
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deviation higher led to improvement in students’ own test scores by a 
standard deviation of 0.37 to 0.41. 
In Pakistan, where both public and private schools compete for students 
at the village level, Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2014) discovered that test 
scores improved by a standard deviation of 0.11 when researchers provided 
report cards containing average test scores for all schools at the village level. 
Formal sanctions or rewards
SRCs can provide information that facilitates an education authority’s 
decision to formally sanction or reward schools in a ‘hard’ accountability 
model. As Smith (2015) explains, ‘the consequences in formal sanction/
reward systems are explicit and enacted through formal channels’. More and 
more countries have linked school performance with financial rewards, 
technical assistance, or system-based punishment. For example, the federal 
government in Brazil provides additional resources to low-performing 
municipalities according to their average standardized test scores. In the 
Mexican state of Colima, low-performing schools receive a diagnosis of test 
results as well as assistance to develop school improvement plans. In the 
United States, low-performing schools in Virginia risk losing state 
accreditation and are required to adopt and implement school improvement 
plans. These practices are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
Public participation
SRCs may lead to more public participation and therefore positive behaviour 
change by both the service provider and the consumer or the community at 
large. Instead of retaining a false perception of adequate school performance, 
information can provide more accurate evidence of school quality, becoming 
a ‘motivator for action’ for parents and the community (Bruns, Filmer, and 
Patrinos, 2011). Increased participation by parents and community members 
in the public monitoring of education services has the potential to change 
the behaviour of service providers. For example, an experiment in the health 
sector in Uganda showed that provision of a scorecard on the quality of health 
27
Literature review of school report cards
facilities and encouragement of community-based monitoring in treatment 
villages improved healthcare quality significantly, with a corresponding drop 
in infant mortality of 33 per cent (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009). 
In the education sector in India, an impact evaluation in three states 
showed that community-level information campaigns on the roles and 
responsibilities of the public in school management led to an improvement 
in service delivery, with teacher attendance, for example, improving by 
11 per cent in Uttar Pradesh (Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman, 2009). 
Increased public participation not only helps to put pressure on service 
providers, such as teachers and schools, it also helps to coordinate efforts 
among all education stakeholders. Such coordination is important because 
education involves not only schools, but also parents and the community. 
Research indicates that improved communication and coordination results 
in a corresponding increase in the level of investment by all stakeholders to 
improve children’s education. 
In a year-long impact evaluation in Uganda, Barr et al. (2012) compared 
the effect of participatory SRCs with that of standardized report cards. They 
found that participatory SRCs – which allowed parents and communities to 
select indicators on school quality measures that they considered relevant 
– helped to reduce student and teacher absenteeism by 8.9  per  cent and 
13.2 per cent, respectively. They also increased pupil test scores by a standard 
deviation of approximately 0.19. Furthermore, a laboratory game conducted 
during the study shows that the participatory approach in SRC design seems 
to have changed group psychology, as members of the participatory model 
showed a higher tendency to contribute to the public good (see Box 1.1). 
This insight into personal preference in ‘public good games’ is important, as 
research shows a direct correlation between that preference and an 
individual’s propensity to collaborate in participatory accountability systems 
(Barr, Packard, and Serra, 2014).
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Box 1.1 Laboratory game to test participants’ willingness to contribute 
to the public good
As part of an impact evaluation on the effectiveness of participatory SRC in Uganda conducted 
by Barr et al. (2012), a laboratory game was designed to test participants’ propensity to 
contribute to the public good. Each of the 12 participants was responsible for either 
standardized or participatory school-level scorecards and were given the option to allocate 
a token to either a private or a group account. If allocated to the private account, the token 
returned a value of UGX 5,000 (approximately US$2.50); if allocated to the group account, 
each token returned a value of UGX 1,000 to all participants. In other words, an individual’s 
decision to contribute to the group account depended highly on his or her belief in others’ 
willingness to contribute as well. The study found that members belonging to the 
participatory scorecard treatment group showed a higher tendency to contribute to the 
group account than those belonging to the standardized scorecard treatment group. 
Source: Barr et al., 2012.
Figure 1.1 How school-level information can increase accountability in 
education systems 
Source: Adapted from Smith, 2015.
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1.2 Potential reasons for limitations and unintended 
consequences of SRCs
Although information has the potential to lead to positive behaviour change 
in communities and schools, this capacity has not necessarily been manifested 
in research experiments. For example, a study in India showed that providing 
the community with information on school quality and the role of local 
education committees elicited no change in parental behaviour (Banerjee et 
al., 2010). In an impact evaluation in Kenya, researchers found that providing 
parents with information on pupils’ performance in literacy and numeracy 
assessments and strategies for participation led to no significant change in 
private or collective action (Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai, 2013).
There are multiple reasons why the simple provision of information is 
not a simply remedy for improving accountability or school management 
and quality. 
The free-rider problem
As Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos (2011) note, one important characteristic of 
information is that ‘once it has been created and disseminated, it can be used 
by all – and one person’s use does not reduce another person’s use’. 
Information presented in SRCs constitutes what economists call a ‘public 
good’ and is therefore subject to the free-rider problem (Bjorkman and 
Svensson, 2009). That is to say, because the information provided by an SRC 
cannot be harnessed by a single individual for his or her exclusive benefit, 
some stakeholders may choose not to contribute or participate in measures 
designed to make improvements to school practices based on this 
information, but still benefit from actions taken by those who do (Barr, 
Packard, and Serra, 2014). In addition, while report cards provide more 
systematic information on school management and student learning, parents 
may only care about their individual student’s education and not about 
changing the broader school community (Levin, 1974). 
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Lack of incentives
Lack of incentives is often cited as a reason for the failure of the ‘information-
for-accountability‘ model. Even in cases where information is provided, if 
parents do not believe in the value of education, public access to information 
may not lead to any action (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011). According 
to the 2008 Kenya Afrobarometer survey, only 11 per cent of respondents 
thought community members had primary responsibility for managing 
schools (Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai, 2013). Smith and Rowland (2014) 
further note that voicing concerns can be a ‘costly’ exercise, as the time 
involved may otherwise be used for an economically productive activity, 
such as farming. In certain cases, community members simply accord 
improvements in education quality a lower priority than other competing 
issues (Banerjee et  al., 2010; Mizala and Urquiola, 2013). Hastings and 
Weinstein (2008) also note that even in situations where parents have the 
freedom to choose better-performing schools (e.g. the United States), the 
best predictor of whether parents actually exercise that right is proximity to 
those schools. ‘Parents choose schools to maximize utility, which is increasing 
in expected academic achievement but decreasing in time and travel costs, 
and … even with transparent information, school choice can only be as 
effective as the options offered to parents’ (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008).
Lack of capacity 
As Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai (2013) argue, even when citizens have the 
incentives to change education service delivery, they need to understand 
‘whom to contact, what to say, and more generally, how the political and 
educational systems work and where they can most effectively apply pressure 
for improvements’. Otherwise the lack of capacity may become a ‘roadblock’ 
preventing them from taking action, or leading them to undertake actions 
that have no impact. During their impact evaluation of 550 households in 
26 Kenyan villages, Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai (2013) found that 
72 per cent of parents reported that they did not know what actions to take, 
or would not know which strategy to use to ascertain what actions to take, 
even once presented with their children’s test scores. 
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Lack of enabling environment (school autonomy and school 
choice)
Lack of school autonomy may also explain why information provision alone 
leads to no change in school management. Namely, if schools and 
communities are not sufficiently involved in teacher hiring, resource 
allocation, or budgeting, little can be done – even when these stakeholders 
want to use information obtained from SRCs to drive changes in school 
practices (Smith, 2015). Conversely, lack of school choice also decreases the 
potential effectiveness of school-level information. If parents and students 
are not empowered to select better-performing schools based on the available 
information, the mere provision of SRCs will not lead to school improvement 
measures that are propelled by inter-school competition. 
Inequality effect and ‘elite capture’
Research indicates that provision of SRCs may result in unintended 
consequences if they are not carefully designed. For example, SRCs may 
exacerbate education inequality in cases where illiterate parents are unable 
to easily understand the information presented. Such situations result in ‘elite 
capture’ of information (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011). Instead of 
representing the voices of the community as a whole, more educated or 
politically powerful individuals may employ information to advance their 
own ends, sometimes to the detriment of others (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 
2011). For example, in the United States, California’s school choice option5 
has led to more market control by private organizations under the pretext of 
representing parents’ voices in ‘firing’ ineffective schools. As Smith and 
Rowland (2014) discovered, organizations with special interests tend to 
possess more expertise and incentives to organize parent petitions for 
reforming or closing local schools. In particular, when parents lack the 
necessary information to make the best educational choice for their children, 
‘the likelihood that their voices will be drowned out by interest groups rises’ 
5. Under California’s parent trigger law, when a local school is failing, the parents can ‘pull the trigger’. They do so by 
presenting a petition which must be signed by the majority of parents. They can then choose a future plan for the 
school from four options: the turnaround model, the restart model, school closure, and the transformation model. 
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(Smith and Rowland, 2014). For example, in one case where a majority of 
parents signed a petition for a school turnaround plan, it transpired that some 
did not necessarily understand the petition they had signed (Los Angeles 
Times, 2011).
Gaming the system 
Other potential negative consequences include attempts by schools’ to ‘game 
the system’ when information on school performance is linked to a high-
stakes school evaluation. Again, in the United States, some schools 
intentionally exclude low-performing students to appear more effective in 
state-wide assessments (Smith and Rowland, 2014). 
1.3 Implementation matters
Recent research has explored the effectiveness of supplying stakeholders 
with information as a means of improving education in various developing 
countries. The results have been mixed for a variety of reasons. Researchers 
have proposed a number of theories to explain the success or failure of SRCs. 
The study took this a step further by comparing the implementation strategy 
of the evaluation studies featured in the previous section. As can be seen in 
Table  1.1, the effectiveness of information campaigns cannot be easily 
generalized as each study varies in its specific design. It is worth noting, for 
example, that experiments which have shown positive results tend to combine 
the provision of information with community mobilization. Moreover, in 
participation models, some of the successful experiments target both the 
service provider and the community. 
A review of existing literature shows mixed results from SRCs. On the 
one hand, information at the school level may stimulate change through 
multiple channels. In a market and school-choice-enabled environment, 
information puts pressure on schools to improve performance. With the 
presence of formal sanction and reward systems, information enables system 
administrators to manage schools according to their quality, again adding 
incentive for schools to improve. Furthermore, information can help parents 
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form a more accurate picture of their child’s school and therefore participate 
in public monitoring of education services or better contribute to their 
children’s education. 
Table 1.1 Comparison of the design of recent impact evaluations on 
information-for-accountability/school report cards
Study Positive 
results?
Stakeholder* Strategy** Model
Pakistan 
(Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja, 
2014)
Yes Single  
(parents only)
Information only Market
Uganda 
(Barr et al., 2012)
Yes Multiple Information + 
mobilization
Participation
Uganda  
(Bjorkman and Svensson, 
2009)
Yes Multiple Information + 
mobilization
Participation
India  
(Pandey, Goyal, and 
Sundararaman, 2011)
Yes Single 
(community 
members only)
Information + 
mobilization
Participation
India 
(Banerjee et al., 2010)
No Single 
(community 
members only) 
Information + 
mobilization 
Participation
Kenya 
(Lieberman, Posner, 
and Tsai, 2013)
No Single  
(parent only)
Information only Participation
Notes: * Stakeholders may include service providers (teachers and schools), consumers (community 
members), and the government. This category examines whether the study addresses only single or 
multiple stakeholders in the education sector.
** This category examines whether the study design only provides information or also involves 
community mobilization (e.g.  involving community members in data collection and discussion, 
educating communities about their right to information).
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On the other hand, as Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai (2013) note, the 
information-for-accountability model includes many assumptions and is 
subject to failure for a variety of reasons. The literature also reveals that 
parents in developing countries may lack the incentive or capacity to act on 
the information they receive. In addition, as noted earlier, report cards can 
also lead to unintended consequences such as elite capture or schools gaming 
the system. 
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Chapter 2
School report cards: Country overviews 
Bearing in mind the potential of SRC information, as well as careful 
consideration of their limitations, the study examined a variety of SRC 
practices to establish whether research findings are reflected in implementation, 
and how recent country cases can better inform or complement research 
results. This chapter presents findings based on a detailed overview of the 
design and implementation of SRCs in different countries. Country cases 
are grouped by models – whether information is used within a formal 
sanction/reward system to increase accountability, or as a means to encourage 
social monitoring and participation to hold schools accountable.6 These 
different examples provide important empirical evidence regarding the 
success or otherwise of the information-for-accountability approach in 
transforming the education development landscape. The actual name of 
SRCs may differ by country, as shown in the summary descriptions below.
2.1 Formal sanction or reward models
Brazil: Basic Education Development Index (since 2007) 
In 2007, Brazil launched an important initiative under the Education 
Development Plan, a systematic measurement of education quality in schools 
in each municipality of the country. This initiative employed an indicator 
called the Basic Education Development Index (IDEB in Portuguese). The 
main aim of this effort was to hold schools accountable for student learning 
outcomes at the national level by setting benchmarks and creating a culture 
of assessment. In addition to serving as a yardstick for school quality, the 
IDEB also guides the education authority in making more informed decisions 
about resource allocation and technical assistance for schools. 
6. The report does not discuss the use of information for school choice, as suitable cases for that model could not be 
identified. 
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Data source and content
The IDEB is calculated for each school based on: (i)  average student 
performance in a national, census-based test for Portuguese and Maths at 
Grades 4 and 8, combined with assessment data for Grade 11 students; and 
(ii) the average student promotion rate7 from grade to grade, the repetition 
rate and the graduation rate. When combined, those indicators measure a 
school’s education quality and its internal efficiency. The data are scaled as 
an index score from 1 to 10 with the levels aligned to PISA scores (OECD, 
2011). Every two years, the federal government sets individual targets for 
schools based on a trajectory starting in 2005 and ending in 2021, with the 
aim of bringing each school in line with the average worldwide PISA score. 
Schools are also responsible for developing their own improvement plans in 
collaboration with their municipalities, which are then monitored at the state 
level (OECD, 2011). 
Distribution
Results from the IDEB are published for each school and then compared 
with peers in the same municipality and the national average. Each school 
is supposed to discuss an improvement strategy with parents and communities 
before additional resources are disbursed to help schools achieve their 
pre-identified targets (OECD, 2011). 
Consequences
The federal government links school performance with concrete 
consequences – the 1,000 lowest-performing municipalities receive extra 
resources, and the remaining low-performing municipalities receive technical 
support (Buchmann and Neri, 2008).
7. The promotion rate refers to the average promotion rate between grades, and is calculated by education level.
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Box 2.1 IDESP in the state of Sao Paulo
The state of Sao Paulo in Brazil has taken the IDEB a step further by creating its own state-
wide assessment system and school report card, entitled the Education Development Index 
of the State of Sao Paulo (or IDESP in Portuguese). Created in 2007, the IDESP is calculated 
by combining a school’s average performance on Sao Paulo’s standardized tests and student 
promotion rates. Every school has an annual growth objective reflecting its starting point 
each year, as well as the socioeconomic status of its students. Teachers, school managers, 
parents, and communities monitor the school’s progress towards this goal. School 
achievement is directly linked to employees’ performance bonuses, with consideration given 
to a school’s background. If a school reaches 100 per cent of the set target, its employees 
receive 100 per cent of the bonus. If it reaches 80 per cent of the target, employees receive 
80  per cent. If a school does not attain its goal, its employees become ineligible for 
performance bonuses. 
For more information, see: www.educacao.sp.gov.br/noticias/servidor-entenda-as-metas-
do-idesp-e-consulte-o-indice-de-sua-escola.
Colombia: School Excellence Report (since 2015) 
Colombia aspires to become the most educated country in the region by 
2025, but faces a unique challenge in building accountability into its 
education system, as it is the only country in Latin America with no national 
curriculum by grade or subject.8 Consequently, few accountability 
mechanisms exist to monitor the educational quality of individual schools. 
Since 2013, Colombia has worked to respond to the challenge, enhancing 
monitoring efforts by administering annual standardized tests for Grades 3, 
5, and 9. School Excellence Reports were introduced in 2015 to provide 
better feedback to schools, to help create standards and goals, and to engage 
parents and communities in dialogue. 
Data source
The School Excellence Report contains information on average performances 
in literacy and maths from national standardized learning assessments for 
8. Decentralized curricula have been implemented in Colombia since 1994. 
38
Promoting transparency through information:  
A global review of school report cards
students in Grades 3, 5, and 9,9 as well as average student promotion rates. 
Each school also receives a score for its combined performance against a 
number of indicators (namely: Progress, Performance, Efficiency and School 
Climate) on a scale of 1 to 10 (see Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 One section of the Colombia School Excellence Report
Source: Horacio Alvarez, Inter-American Development Bank.
Distribution
The results of School Excellence Reports are available online and published 
once a year in preparation for ‘Day E’. The Ministry of Education has 
nominated 25 March as Day E, or a ‘Day of Excellence’,10 when principals 
and teachers are encouraged to discuss their school’s performance on the 
report and plans for school improvement. Activity kits are sent to public 
schools to provide technical guidance on information dissemination and 
9. Census-based standardized exams have been implemented since 2013. 
10. Activities during Day E are supposed to be mandatory among public schools, but the Ministry has not established 
formal procedures to enforce implementation. 
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discussion. To increase accountability, the Ministry encourages schools to 
coordinate with local education offices and to sign an ‘Agreement of 
Excellence’ listing their goals for the following year. 
Consequences
At present, the Agreement of Excellence does not include consequences for 
success or failure. However, the Ministry of Education has announced that, 
as of 2016, it will start rewarding schools financially based on the degree to 
which they meet their self-designated goals.11 
Ghana: School Report Card (since 2011) 
Ghana first piloted its SRC programme in 2004–2005 with funding from 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Subsequent 
funding from the Ghana Partnership for Education Fund Grant,12 led by the 
World Bank, has enabled the implementation of SRCs in 75 disadvantaged 
districts. While traditional EMIS school reports are intended to facilitate 
government planning of educational resources, the SRCs aim to present 
up-to-date school-level information in a more pictorial format to community 
members participating in school management through school performance 
appraisal meetings (SPAMs). 
Data source and content
Each school’s head teacher fills out a SRC data capture form containing a 
series of questions. The results from each school are then forwarded to the 
district education office, which produces school reports in the form of tables 
and charts. The data collection process happens twice a year at the beginning 
of the first and third terms. The SRC covers enrolment, pupil performance, 
attendance, number of textbooks, and student learning outcomes. It also 
includes teacher attendance, receipt of grants, and number of school meetings 
11. The financial incentive scheme has not yet been formalized into education law. 
12. The grant plans to disburse a total of US$75 million between October 2012 and October 2015, and aims to ‘improve 
the planning, monitoring, and delivery of basic education services in deprived districts of the recipient’s territory’. 
For more information, see: www.worldbank.org/projects/P129381/ghana-education-all-gpef?lang=en.
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held by parent–teacher associations (PTAs) and school management 
committees (SMCs). Although Ghana’s SRCs contain student achievement 
data, it is noteworthy that the data come from assessments administered by 
teachers from individual schools. Since the assessments are not standardized, 
it is not possible to compare student achievement across schools or districts.
Distribution
The head teacher is supposed to post the SRC results openly. However, at 
present the majority of SRCs are posted only on the wall of the head teacher’s 
office, which greatly limits access to this school-level data. In Ghana, each 
school is required to have a SPAM, which comprises community members 
who are responsible for monitoring school performance, participating in 
school management, and designing school improvement plans. SPAM 
members are supposed to use SRC results to guide the decision-making 
process and develop a school performance improvement plan (SPIP). 
However, the extent to which SPAM members incorporate the school-level 
information varies greatly by community, and depends on the will and 
capacity of each SPAM. 
Consequences
Submitting a SPIP is a prerequisite for schools to receive a capitation grant. 
District education officers also assess individual school performance against 
school’s preset plans, but as of autumn 2015 there were no consequences 
linked to school performance. 
Guatemala: School Profile/Ficha Escolar (since 2013)
To increase transparency on the performance of its education system, the 
Guatemala Ministry of Education launched an online portal entitled the 
National Education Systems Indicator (SNIE in Spanish), which provides 
updated information on a series of indicators on education quality and 
financing (see Figure 2.2). The school profile (ficha escolar) is an important 
component of the online information transparency system, and provides 
policy-makers, school staff, and the public with school-level information on 
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areas including student enrolment, school expenditure, and student learning 
outcomes. School profiles are designed to help guide education policy 
planning and raise public awareness about school quality. 
Figure 2.2 Online portal of the National Education Systems Indicator 
Source: SNIE website.
Data source and content
School profiles contain a variety of indicators that present a holistic picture 
of operation, performance, and changes in the school across time.13 The 
school-level information includes: 
• general data including whether the school is public or private, is situated 
in an urban or rural area, and has a school board and a school governance 
structure;
13. For a sample school profile, see http://estadistica.mineduc.gob.gt/fichaescolar/.
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• student enrolment numbers by grade and gender;
• efficiency indicators including promotion, retention, and completion 
rates by grade, gender, and year;
• bilingual education data such as whether the school is monolingual or 
bilingual, the main language of the community, and the ethnic 
composition of students and teachers; 
• special education information including the number of students with 
special education needs and the amount of special education resources;
• standardized tests results on reading and maths;
• the number and positions of teaching and administrative staff;
• the school’s resource allocation including the breakdown of financial 
allocations for each school programme as well as its intended 
beneficiaries. 
Distribution
School profiles are posted on the online portal where the information is 
available to the general public. 
Consequences
No concrete consequences for school performance have been established 
based on school profile information.
Mexico: School Report Card (since 2005) 
The Ministry of Education in Mexico openly states on its website that it is 
‘committed to transparency and accountability’, that it considers the 
information parents have about schools to be ‘fundamental to the 
participation of the educational community’, and that it will ‘contribute to 
improving the educational system’.14 As part of its efforts to provide 
information on school quality, the Ministry has been administering and 
disseminating school performance data on nationwide standardized learning 
assessments for multiple grades in primary and secondary schools. 
14. See the Ministry of Education’s website for more details: www.enlace.sep.gob.mx/content/ba/pages/estadisticas/. 
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Data source and content
The content of Mexico’s SRC comes from a nationwide standardized test 
called ENLACE, which covers Spanish, mathematics, and one other rotating 
subject. The Ministry sends schools their SRCs in a poster format that offers 
a visual representation of how the school fared in the assessment in recent 
years, as well as in comparison with the state and national averages. 
Furthermore, school directors and teachers can access the ENLACE website, 
where they can enter unique school codes to examine data on student 
performance in different sub-areas of the subject tests. Detailed information 
on student performance is available at both the classroom and school level. 
For example, student performance on the mathematics test includes a 
detailed analysis of questions answered correctly or incorrectly by a majority 
of students. The corresponding subject area is presented in a colour-coded 
visual format. This analysis helps teachers to make future pedagogical 
adjustments in a targeted way. 
Distribution
Schools are required to post the results of the ENLACE assessment at the 
entrance of the school building to ensure the information is readily available 
to the public. Every two months, school directors are required to host 
meetings with the ‘school council of social participation’ – an organization 
in each school consisting of parents, teachers, and former students – to discuss 
the ENLACE results. They are also required to host meetings with teachers 
and PTA members to discuss implementation of the school’s improvement 
plans. Availability of information about school performance through the 
ENLACE results has empowered parents to demand higher-quality education 
from schools. 
Consequences
No punishment or rewards have been linked to school performance in 
Mexico. 
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Box 2.2 Mexico’s Special Programme for the Improvement of Educational 
Achievement (PAE) in the state of Colima (2009–2011)
The Special Programme for the Improvement of Educational Achievement (Programa de 
Atencion Especifica para la Mejora del Logro Educativo) in the state of Colima, Mexico, 
takes transparency on school quality a step further. It aims to improve the education provided 
by low-performing schools through a ‘supportive and collaborative environment’ in which 
teachers and school directors are advised how to interpret the ENLACE results and make 
corresponding pedagogical adjustments (De Hoyos, Garcia-Moreno, and Patrinos, 2015). 
According to school performance on the nationwide ENLACE standardized tests, the governor 
selected and published the names of 108 low-performing schools in the state. In the 
announcement, the governor emphasized that the government also shouldered responsibility 
for the poor performance. Each school was then assigned a ‘pedagogical advisor’ who trained 
teachers on how to interpret the ENLACE results and access the ENLACE website to understand 
detailed information regarding student performance on different questions of the subject 
tests.
Through the establishment of professional data networks, the schools were connected with 
best-performing schools in the same locality, and advised on how to develop school 
improvement plans. An evaluation study shows that the ‘process of self-evaluation and 
analysis’ in a ‘shared-responsibility’ model helped to improve test scores for low-performing 
schools. However, further implementation of school improvement plans and pedagogical 
interventions failed to correlate with improvements in student learning outcomes (De 
Hoyos, Garcia-Moreno, and Patrinos, 2015).
Tanzania: PSLE School Ranking (since 2013)
Education is one of the Government of Tanzania’s priority areas under its 
‘Big Results Now’ initiative, which emphasizes improving information 
transparency to increase accountability in public services. The demand for 
transparency in education data is further facilitated by the government’s 
‘Open Data’ initiative. In this framework, the government has published 
school-level primary and secondary leaving exam (PSLE) results to hold 
schools accountable for student performance since 2013. The government 
also set up national learning goals aimed at achieving passing rates for PSLEs 
of 60 per cent in 2013, 70 per cent in 2014, and 80 per cent in 2015. 
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Table 2.1 Tanzania PSLE school ranking
PSLE 2014 school ranking
Key: BAND 1 AVG 250 to 228, BAND 2: 227 to 206, BAND 3: 205 to 181, BAND 4: 180 to 156, BAND 5:155 to 131, BAND 6:130 to 106, BAND 7:105 to 81, 
BAND 8: 80 to 56, BAND 9:55 to 28, BAND 10:27 to 0
Centre  
name
District 
name
Region  
name
Clean 
candidates
2014
Number 
of 
students 
passed 
(A-C)
Average 
total 
marks 
(/250) 
2014
Average 
total 
marks 
(/250) 
2013
Change  
on average 
total marks 
from 2013
Band of 
school 
2014
Band of 
school 
2013
Rank 
of school 
2014
Rank of 
school 
2013
Twibhoki Primary 
School
Serengeti Mara 33 33 234.7 208.3 26.4 1 2 1 29
Mugini English 
Medium Primary 
School
Magu Mwanza 40 40 231.2 228.52 2.68 1 1 2 3
Peaceland English 
Medium School
Ukerewe Mwanza 17 17 230.59 211.5 19.09 1 2 3 23
Alliance English 
Medium 
Mwanza Ji Mwanza 25 25 230.04 216.1 13.94 1 2 4 15
Kwema Modern 
Primary School
Kahama Mji Shinyanga 50 50 229.38 1 5
St Severine English 
Medium Primary 
School
Biharamulo Kagera 53 53 227.43 2 6
Rocken Hill 
Primary School
Kahama Mji Shinyanga 58 58 227.03 2 7
Tusiime Primary 
School
Ilala(M) Dar es 
Salaam
168 168 225.37 230.01 -4.64 2 1 8 2
Imani Primary 
School
Moshi (V) Kilimanjaro 29 29 223.34 218.75 4.59 2 2 9 12
Palikas Primary 
School
Kahama Mji Shinyanga 19 19 222.47 2 10
Source: National Examinations Council of Tanzania website. 
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Data source and content
Tanzania ranks all public schools nationwide according to the average student 
score on the PSLEs. The ranking report presents each school’s ranking 
nationwide, the number of students who have attended the exam versus the 
number that passed, and the average student score from the current and the 
previous year, as well as the school’s ranking in the previous year. Schools 
are further divided into 10 colour-coded bands depending on the average 
student score (see Table 2.1). In addition to the school ranking report by 
average student score, a separate report ranks schools by the degree of 
improvement achieved since the previous year. 
Distribution 
The school ranking is available online. The public can also look up specific 
schools and the performances of individual students.
Consequences
No concrete consequences have been linked to school performance based 
on PSLE school rankings.
United States: The Virginia School Report Card (since 1997)15
In the United States, the state of Virginia provides transparent information 
on school quality and student achievement by posting SRCs online. The 
SRCs form part of two accountability programmes: state accreditation and 
a federal requirement. 
To qualify for state accreditation, a school must meet state-mandated 
requirements in student achievement levels in English, history, mathematics, 
and science on state-wide assessments. High schools must meet additional 
minimum benchmarks for graduation and completion. Schools must also 
establish annual measurable objectives (AMOs) as required by the federal 
15. The school report card has been used in Virginia since 1997 but has gone through various changes. This section 
focuses on the most recent version. 
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government under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).16 
AMOs include proficiency targets in reading and maths for all students as 
well as student subgroups such as minority students, students with 
disabilities, and economically disadvantaged students, so that schools can 
focus on closing achievement gaps among these subgroups (Virginia 
Department of Education, 2014).
Data source and content
Virginia School Report Cards provide information on:
• state accreditation results based on average student performance in 
English, mathematics, history, and science;
• the Proficiency Gap Dashboard for Federal Accountability, which 
indicates whether schools meet annual targets in student proficiency 
rates, for all students as well as student gap groups, in reading and 
maths;17
• student proficiency levels in other academic subjects such as writing 
and history;
• teacher qualification information including teachers’ educational 
attainment and licensing;
• school safety indicators, which lists the number of offences by category 
(e.g. weapons offences, offences against student or staff, and property 
offences) for the last three years; 
• overall student enrolment as well as enrolment in advanced programmes;
• student graduation information for high schools; 
• schools performance against targets set by the federal government.
Distribution
School report cards are made accessible to the public online. 
16. ESEA has been known as No Child Left Behind since 2001.
17. Gap groups are traditionally underperforming students. Gap Group  1 are students with disabilities, English 
language learners, and economically disadvantaged students. Gap Group 2 are African-American students. Gap 
Group 3 are Hispanic students. 
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Consequences
Schools that do not meet the minimum state requirement may risk losing 
state accreditation. Schools that are denied state accreditation are required 
to provide parents and other interested parties with ‘written notice of the 
school’s accreditation rating within 30 calendar days of the announcement 
of the rating’, as well as a copy of the school district’s proposed ‘corrective 
action plan’ describing steps to be taken to improve student learning 
outcomes (Virginia Department of Education, 2014).
Table 2.2 A section of the Virginia School Report Card
State accreditation results for all students
Subject Accreditation 2012–2013 2013–2014 2014–2015
Benchmark 1  
year
3 
years
1  
year
3 
years
1  
year
3 
years
Met accreditation 
benchmark
English 75 95 97 91 95 91 92 Yes
Mathematics 70 91 96 90 93 92 91 Yes
History 70 95 97 98 97 99 98 Yes
Science 70 95 98 97 97 93 95 Yes
Source: Virginia Department of Education website. 
Note: The table summarizes the data used in calculating the state accreditation status of the school 
and is reported for the ‘all students’ group. Yes = Met objectives based on current year results.
2.2 Public participation models
India: School Report Cards (since 2005) 
Since 2005, a civil society organization called Pratham has been heading 
citizen-led assessments on reading and literacy for children in India, the 
results of which are published through the Annual Status of Education Report 
(ASER). To further raise public awareness of the state of education quality 
in India, Pratham publishes school report cards, which combine learning 
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outcome results collected from communities and state-level performance18 
on key school indicators. ASER’s annual report complements the official 
district report cards published through the District Information Systems of 
Education.19
Data source and content
Data collection is accomplished through citizen-led, large-scale surveys 
organized by Pratham involving approximately 300,000 households in more 
than 15,000 villages. During the two-day survey, volunteers visit the public 
schools and record information on Right to Education20 indicators, including 
student enrolment and attendance, teachers’ appointment and attendance, 
school facilities, and government disbursement of school grants.21
Distribution
School-level results are aggregated at the district and province levels and are 
available online. Pratham also presents the results through state-level 
presentations for audiences including government officials, civil society 
organizations, and international partner organizations. As data collection is 
conducted by and among community members, the process helps to raise 
citizen awareness of education quality. 
Consequences
No consequences have been linked with school performance.
18. Unlike other country cases featured in this report, Pratham does not publish school-level report cards. As specified 
later, however, data collection is undertaken at the school level by volunteers in the villages, and the process itself 
helps to educate the public about school-level education quality. 
19. District-level data have been available since 1999 as part of the ongoing EMIS effort by the Government of India. 
For more information on DISE, visit: www.dise.in.
20. The RTE Act enacted in 2009 states that every child in India between the ages of 6 and 14 is entitled to free and 
compulsory elementary education. It sets requirements on student enrolment, teaching, and learning in schools. 
21. SSA grants are the only form of school funding over which schools have autonomy. 
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Indonesia: Community scorecards (since 2014)
Education quality in rural areas of Indonesia is low compared with the rest 
of the country. Teacher absenteeism is especially rampant: the national 
average is about 10  per  cent and may reach 20  per  cent in rural areas. 
Monitoring teacher attendance has proven challenging for district 
governments due to geographic constraints, as well as the high cost of time 
and transportation. In 2010, the Indonesian government launched an 
initiative entitled the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty 
Reduction (TNP2K) to find creative methods to coordinate the acceleration 
of poverty alleviation in different sectors. As part of the initiative, TNP2K 
is piloting a series of interventions among 31 villages in three districts to 
address the problem of teacher absenteeism in remote villages. 
Community scorecards are one of those interventions. By establishing 
service agreements and enhancing public monitoring of teacher and school 
performances, TNP2K is hoping to increase teacher attendance and improve 
school quality with the mobilization of communities, schools, and teachers 
alike. The initiative planned to conduct the first phase of the pilot between 
2014 and 2015, and then expand the pilot to 400 villages in six to nine 
districts. 
Data source and content 
To decide on the content of the community scorecard, extensive consultative 
meetings are held separately among teachers, community members, and 
student alumni of the targeted schools in order to identify key problems and 
needs from all stakeholders involved. The facilitators then organize interface 
meetings at the village level to share the inputs and facilitate discussions, 
after which a service agreement is established between teachers and 
community members. Community members are asked to establish five to 
eight indicators to gauge the performance of teachers and principals. Teacher 
attendance is a mandatory indicator because it addresses the issue of teacher 
absenteeism. Other indicators vary by community, and include whether 
teachers regularly assign students homework, whether they use corporal 
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punishment, and whether they visit absent students. Teachers in turn 
establish indicators to better solicit and guarantee parents’ contribution to 
students’ education22 (see Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3 A service agreement between teachers and parents (with 
translation)
Teachers’ inputs for parents in Ampas, Keerom
Not asking children to work
Not hitting children
Provide breakfast for children before going to school
Ensure children come to school on time
Ask children what they learned and whether or not they have 
homework
Source: Dewi Susanti, TNP2K.
After establishing the key indicators, the village forms a user committee23 
consisting of nine members including the school principal, teachers, 
representatives from the village council, youth leaders, parents, and other 
community members. 
The user committee is tasked with monitoring and scoring each teacher 
and principal on a monthly basis. The monitoring methods vary by 
community and depend on the specific indicators chosen. For example, some 
user committees ensure at least one person is present at the school on a daily 
basis, and take turns accordingly. Other user committees monitor certain 
indicators such as corporal punishment by consulting students and parents 
who live close to the school. 
22. Parent’s performance is not monitored. 
23. The standard of a user committee mirrors that of a school committee, which is recommended but seldom set up in 
rural communities.
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Figure 2.4 Sample of community scorecard (with translation)
INDICATOR Score
1. Teacher comes to school on time from Monday 
to Friday, 7.30am – 12.15pm and Saturday, 
7.30am – 10.00am
2
2. Teacher does not hit, pinch, or yell at students 
during school time
1
3. Teacher provides additional lessons once a 
week outside of school time for students behind in 
reading, writing, and maths
2
4. Teacher and parents meeting held once a month 1
5. Teacher provides homework for students three 
times a week
1
6. Teacher gives symbols for students who 
diligently go to school
2
7. Teacher visits students who have been absent for 
more than 3 days in a row on day 4
1
Total 10
Source: Dewi Susanti, TNP2K.
For the teacher attendance indicator, TNP2K employs an innovative 
monitoring technique: teachers are required to report their attendance by 
submitting daily pictures with students and school facilities through a mobile 
phone application. The result is then shared with the user committee to 
determine the teacher’s attendance score.24 
The example of a community score card shown in Figure 2.4 shows the 
indicators chosen by a community and their corresponding maximum score. 
Each of the 5–8 indicators is given an assigned ‘weight’ with a total maximum 
score is 10. For example, if the indicator for teacher attendance has a total 
possible score of 2, communities may give a teacher a rating of 1.5. 
24. Each school typically has three to four teachers with a maximum of 12 to 15. 
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Distribution
Each user committee is charged with making a monthly public announcement 
about teacher and principal performances. They also post results in a public 
space to promote information transparency. At the district government level, 
the TNP2K task force submits monthly monitoring results to enable district 
governments to keep abreast of community perceptions of teacher and school 
quality. 
Consequences 
TNP2K has encouraged district governments to link teacher salaries to 
attendance and performance in the future phases of the programme 
implementation. 
Malawi: School Feedback Report in Dedza District (since 
2012)25
Recognizing that governments, schools, and communities often lack the 
information necessary for school planning and improvement, a development 
organization called Link Community Development International (Link)26 
has employed a participatory school monitoring and planning process 
entitled school performance review (SPR) in the Dedza district of Malawi. 
The programme aims to facilitate better decision-making for all education 
stakeholders by filling this information gap. SPR invites community members 
to become an integral part of the school planning and improvement process, 
helping them to realize their right and power to hold schools accountable 
and improve education quality. Open discussion and information-sharing 
have helped schools and communities form stronger connections. 
25. SPR was first implemented in the Malangi District of Malawi from 2009 to 2012. Implementation in Dedza District 
started in 2012. 
26. Link works to improve education services in five countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, 
South Africa, and Uganda. For more information, see: www.lcdinternational.org/link-community-development-
international.
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Data source and content
In order to produce school report cards during the SPR process, the district 
education office selects 17 indicators, divided into four categories, which are 
then monitored by primary education advisors – individuals responsible for 
supporting primary schools in their assigned zones of the district – who act 
as data collectors. The four categories are: 
• teaching and learning, which includes classroom environment and 
resources, lesson planning, teaching and learning processes, and 
classroom management;
• leadership and management, which includes financial management of 
the school, management of material resources, headmaster’s supervision 
of teaching and learning activities, and teacher development;
• school governance, which includes community management of the 
school, school–community relations, and community support for 
teaching and learning; 
• child-friendly schools, which assesses inclusiveness, safety, health, and 
gender practices.
Data collection is undertaken by a group of two to four primary 
education advisors and head teachers, who conduct a day-long school visit 
to observe and rate school performance on the district-approved indicators, 
on a scale of one to four. At the end of the day, the group make 
recommendations for school improvement based on the findings, and sends 
the results to the district office, which in turn inputs the information on all 
236 primary schools in the district into a central database. 
Distribution
Following monitoring, schools receive written feedback in the form of a 
report. This provides a detailed description of the rationale behind the 
assigned score for each of the 17 indicators for the school, as well as specific 
recommendations for future improvement (see Table  2.3). The district 
education office also produces school-specific graphics and encourages 
schools to display the information in a public space to help raise community 
awareness of the school’s performance. 
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Consequences
The SPR is not linked to concrete consequences. 
Table 2.3 Sample of one section of the school feedback report
Indicator Evaluation Evidence to support evaluation
Teaching and learning
1.  Resources and physical  
classroom environment
Achieved • Well-swept classrooms
• Most learners seated at desks
• Well-maintained chalkboards
• No learning centres
2.  Lesson preparation 
and planning
Not  
achieved
• No lesson plan available in most classes
• No evidence of thorough lesson preparation
• Records are not kept up to date
5.  Assessment and record 
keeping
Partially  
achieved
• Learners are praised for correct answers
• Marking of learners’ written exercises
• No promotion of homework
• No attendance registers
Recommendations • Have all plans ready before each school day.
• Update attendance registers.
• Distribute the available books to learners.
• Administer homework regularly. 
Source: Link Community Development Malawi, www.lcdinternational.org.
Nigeria: Citizen Report Card in the Niger Delta Region  
(2009–2011)
The citizen report card initiative first started in the state of Delta, Nigeria, 
during 2009–2010, and was led by a civil society group called the Leadership 
Initiative for Transformation and Empowerment (LITE). LITE works to 
improve governance and human rights conditions and promote sustainable 
livelihoods in more than 200 communities in Delta and its neighbouring 
states. In 2010–2011,27 LITE worked with 120 communities in all six states 
of the Niger Delta region to solicit the opinions of community members on 
27. The first year of the project was funded by the United States Institute for Peace, while the second year was funded 
by the European Commission. 
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the delivery of health and education services. They created a citizen report 
card aimed at providing a channel for communities to voice their demand 
for good governance, draw the government’s attention to particular issues, 
and create a call for action to effect policy changes. The use of report cards 
is a means by which government can better understand communities’ 
demands for higher-quality education and health services. 
Data source and content
LITE trains field officers to conduct focus group interviews at the village 
level. In order to ensure participation from different community members, 
focus groups are divided by age and gender: young men, young women, older 
men, and older women. For the year 2012/2013, 470 focus group interviews 
were conducted among 9,000 participants from 120 communities in the 
Niger Delta region in Nigeria. The content of the survey was aggregated at 
the village level. In terms of education service provision, community 
members shared their perceptions of teacher quality and attendance, school 
inputs, and their view of who bears principal responsibility for educational 
improvements. Field officers also visited each school in the village to examine 
the conditions of teacher payment, pupil and teacher populations, and 
operating ratios. The opinions of community leaders were specifically 
solicited as these individuals play an important role in shaping public opinion 
and mobilizing communities. 
Distribution 
Before publishing the results of the citizen report cards, field officers visited 
community members to share and validate the results and to obtain the 
agreement and authorization of community members. Once the reports 
were published, field officers held stakeholder meetings with government 
officials, the press, and community members. Participants reviewed the 
findings during the meetings and shared their conclusions. Local and state 
government officials attended meetings at different levels. Representatives 
from each county are invited to discuss results at state-level meetings, and 
are encouraged to make a statement about future actions to address 
highlighted issues. 
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Consequences 
The government did not link citizens’ perception of education quality to 
specific consequences. 
Pakistan: School Report Card in Punjab Province (since 2013)
School report cards have been implemented for three years in Pakistan’s most 
populous province, Punjab, as one component of the government-led 
education improvement project, the Punjab Education Sector Reform 
Program (PESRP). Under this programme, SRCs have been produced for 
each of the 54,000 public schools in all of the province’s 36 districts. The 
SRC initiative is the province’s first attempt to capitalize on the power of 
decentralized information to promote accountability at the local level.28 The 
SRCs are designed to engage and empower the community by improving 
awareness of the quality of schools’ resources and performance. The main 
audiences for the SRCs are stakeholders at the school level including head 
teachers, teachers, parents, and the community. 
Data source and content
The content of Punjab’s SRCs is based on the province’s central EMIS data. 
The Program Monitoring and Implementation Unit – Punjab’s central 
monitoring department – sends out monitoring and evaluation assistants to 
schools to collect data on a monthly basis. The results are then fed into the 
SRC, which is produced on a semi-annual basis. 
Punjab’s SRCs provide a wealth of information with simple texts and 
straightforward graphics (see Figure 2.5). The information includes: 
• student enrolment and attendance;
• the average passing rate on standardized leaving exams for students in 
Grades 5 and 8;
28. District-level report cards are also produced under PESRP with information available online. For more details, see: 
http://pesrp.edu.pk/home#distranking.
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• teacher hiring;29
• school facilities including the availability of furniture, walls, toilets, 
electricity, and drinking water;
• school environment, which includes the condition of school buildings, 
student uniforms, school grounds, classrooms and latrines;
• school councils,30 which includes the number of school council 
members and the number of school council meetings held;
• school financing, which includes the size of the non-salary budget31 
promised to each school versus the amount actually disbursed, as well 
as the amount ultimately spent by the school. 
Distribution
Distribution still presents a challenge for the government, which has advised 
schools to post the report card information in public spaces to raise 
community awareness about school quality and management. 
Consequences
The government has encountered difficulties in ensuring implementation of 
the policy among all schools, as there are at present no consequences linked 
to the regulation. To better enforce the accessibility of school report card 
data, the government has included ‘whether or not schools post information 
publicly’ as an indicator in the new monitoring process. Schools that do not 
post information receive a warning. Whether this ‘soft approach’ to enforcing 
implementation leads to actual change in school behaviours is yet to be seen. 
29. The report card includes information on the number of teachers the school plans to hire versus the actual number 
of teachers hired. 
30. In Punjab, the role of the school council includes hiring additional teachers, tracking student attendance, and 
advocating the right to education for out-of-school children. A school typically has 7–17 school council members 
comprised of head teachers, community members, and parents. 
31. The non-salary budget of schools is supported by the World Bank to assist in hiring additional teachers or taking 
other measures to improve school conditions. 
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Figure 2.5 A Punjab school report card
Source: PESRP.
Rwanda: Community Score Card (2013) 
The Community Score Card (CSC) initiative was implemented by 
Transparency International Rwanda under the ‘Transparency and 
Accountability in the Management of Resources Allocated to the Nine Years 
Basic Education (9YBE)’ project. Starting in 2011, the project aimed to 
‘increase transparency and accountability in the management of resources 
allocated to the 9YBE’, especially management of the capitation grant for 
school operations. To help achieve the project goal, CSC was implemented 
to increase community participation in school monitoring and evaluation, 
and to create a direct feedback mechanism between service providers and 
users to enhance accountability in the education system.32 Deploying a 
32. The scope of CSC implementation was rather limited, with implementation taking place in only 10 schools from 10 
districts in five provinces across the whole country. 
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combination of social accountability tools, CSC enabled different stakeholder 
groups to evaluate school performance on a series of indicators and, after 
further discussions between service providers and users, elaborate school 
improvement plans. 
Data source and content
9YBE divided the participants into four groups for each school – teachers, 
students, parents, and service providers – with at least eight members per 
group. Moderators then facilitated scoring exercises in each group, during 
which participants were asked to assess the effectiveness of schools based 
on a series of indicators. 
The six groups of indicators were: 
• infrastructure;
• teaching aids/materials;
• social welfare, including the provision of school lunches, student 
insurance, and teacher salaries; 
• participation, including the role of teachers, students, parents, and 
service providers in student performance and school management;
• teaching system, including education system stability and the need for 
education policy review; 
• capitation grant management and outcomes, which included: 
 – effective use of capitation grants by service providers,
 – transparency in the usage of capitation grants,
 – level of fairness and promptness in reporting the number of pupils 
and teachers, 
 – level of fairness in reporting on how schools use capitation grants,
 – level of involvement of teachers in the management of the school,
 – disbursement of funds from the capitation grants,
 – level of community satisfaction on their access to free education 
thanks to grant funds.
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Following the scoring exercises, 9YBE established ‘input tracking 
matrices’ for each school, which compared the resources schools should 
have received (‘entitlement’) according to 9YBE, against their actual 
resources and operations. The matrix only included measurable indicators 
from the group assessments. 
Table 2.4 One section of the Input Tracking Matrix from Rwanda’s CSC
District Musanze
School G.S. Muhoza II
Community 
groups
Entitlement Actual Entitlement Actual Ratio Remarks/
evidence
A Infrastructure
A.1 Classrooms The school 
was supposed 
to have 34 
classrooms.
The school 
has 36 
classrooms.
34 36 105.9% The primary 
classrooms are 
very old and are 
not cemented.
A.2 Toilets There were 
expected to 
be 38 toilets.
They have 
49 toilets 
available.
38 49 128.9% Teachers’ toilets 
are missing, as 
teachers share 
with students.
A.3 Blackboards As they have 
36 classrooms, 
they were 
expected to have 
72 blackboards
They have 58 
blackboards
72 58 80.6% The primary 
classes built 
before 2009 
have only one 
blackboard.
A.4 Electricity The school was 
expected to have 
electricity in all 
classes.
Electricity 
is available 
in only 22 
classes out 
of 36.
36 22 61.1% Within the 22 
classes that have 
electricity some 
are missing 
bulbs.
Source: Transparency International Rwanda.
Distribution
After groups of service users and providers scored the schools separately, the 
results were combined and discussed during an interface meeting. At the 
end of the meeting, participants devised roles and responsibilities for each 
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stakeholder group to enable each to better engage with education and 
contribute to the 9YBE programme. Participants were also expected to 
develop concrete action plans and commit to their implementation in the 
follow-up phases (Transparency International Rwanda, 2013). Transparency 
International Rwanda shouldered the responsibility for ensuring the broader 
community was made aware of the results from the evaluation. 
Consequences
No consequences have been linked with school performance to date. 
Uganda: CVA Community Score Card (since 2008)
Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) is a social accountability tool, developed 
by World Vision, that aims to engage citizens in the monitoring and 
improvement of public service delivery in the health and education sectors 
through collaborative, non-confrontational33 dialogue sessions. Community 
scorecards are an important component of CVA’s data collection and service-
monitoring process. The CVA approach aims to enhance accountability in 
public service delivery and cultivate a sense of collective responsibility among 
community members and service providers. It does so by empowering 
community members to devise a set of indicators for school quality and rate 
the services according to these indicators.
The primary audience for community scorecards are parents, 
communities, and schools.
Data source and content
In the participatory CVA model, both the data sources and content of 
community scorecards are decided by community members. With the 
assistance of World Vision, community members form working teams to 
host community-wide meetings involving all key stakeholders – head 
teachers, teachers, parents, and pupils – who then hold open discussions 
about education issues of importance to them. During the process, 
33. For more details, see the CVA Field Guide: https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B01TNkdJ61czblk1ZWhON2F0cWc/edit.
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communities develop indicators with visual cues for illiterate parents, vote 
on their level of satisfaction (indicated by smiling or sad faces), and create 
an action plan to address key issues hindering education quality in the 
community. As the content of the community scorecard is decided via a 
participatory approach, it varies according to the specific community. 
Common themes introduced by the communities include teacher attendance, 
provision of school lunch, and student absenteeism.
The working teams organize meetings each term. Since the members 
come from within the community, their proximity to the schools offers them 
ample opportunity to evaluate the quality of education service delivery on 
a regular basis.
Distribution
The results of the community scorecards are recognized by all stakeholders, 
as the underlying indicators are devised and then rated by community 
members during the scorecard meetings. Governments are also informed of 
the community scorecard approach from the outset to ensure their buy-in. 
Once results from the community scorecard on the education sector are 
available, the working teams debrief the government before and during 
budget and policy planning sessions to enable the government to make 
tailored decisions regarding resource allocation and policy. According to the 
programme coordinator, however, the reactions of local governments vary. 
While some local governments view the input from community members 
as complementary to the formal school inspection process, others are less 
receptive and see constant feedback from the community as a threat to their 
authority. 
Consequences
Although local governments may make policy and resource-allocation 
decisions based on the scorecards, no formal consequences have been linked 
with school performance to date. 
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Table 2.5 School report cards by motivation, purpose, and audience
Country Report card name Motivation Purpose Audience
Formal sanctions and rewards models
Brazil Basic Education 
Development Index
Pressure from systematic 
learning assessment
Accountability for school 
performance
Schools
Colombia School Excellence Report Political initiative Accountability for school 
performance
Governments, schools, 
and community
Ghana School Report Card Political initiative Transparency on school 
performance and 
community participation 
in school management
Schools and 
communities
Guatemala School Profiles Political initiative Transparency on school 
performance
Schools and the public
Pakistan PESRP School Report Card Decentralization process Feedback from central 
level
Schools, parents, and 
communities
Tanzania PSLE School-Level Report Increase accountability 
under the ‘Big Results 
Now’ initiative and 
improve performance
Accountability for school 
performance
Schools
Mexico School Report Card Political initiative Increase accountability 
and transparency to 
encourage parent 
participation and improve 
school quality
Schools and parents
United States The Virginia School 
Report Card
Federal accountability 
and state accreditation 
requirement
Provide transparency on 
school progress for the 
public
Communities
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Country Report card name Motivation Purpose Audience
Public participation models
India School Report Card Local civil society 
organization (CSO) 
initiative
Community accountability Government, CSOs, and 
communities
Indonesia Community Score Card Political initiative Community monitoring 
for teacher attendance 
and quality
Communities, teachers 
and principals, and the 
government
Malawi School Feedback Report NGO-led effort Facilitate school planning 
process
Initially, parents and 
schools
Nigeria Citizen Report Card Citizen advocacy effort Bottom-up feedback and 
demand for public service
Government
Rwanda Community Score Card NGO-led effort Create direct feedback 
mechanism between 
service providers and users
Communities, schools, 
and pupils
Uganda CVA Community Score
Card
Local demands and 
decentralization process
Increase social 
accountability through 
broader participation
Communities, schools, 
and pupils
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Table 2.6 School report cards by data source, content, and distribution
Process Name of SRC Data sources Content Comparison Publisher of 
SRC
Format of 
SRC
Top-down Brazil – Basic 
Education 
Development Index
Census-based 
assessments
Learning outcomes Standard and 
school with itself
Ministry of  
Education 
Education index
Colombia – Reporte 
de la Excelencia
Standardized tests, 
enrolment data
Promotion rate and 
learning outcomes
Standard and 
school with itself
Ministry of  
Education 
School report
Ghana – School 
Report Card
Head teacher survey 
results
Inputs, processes, and 
outputs
None Ministry of  
Education
School report
Guatemala – 
School Profiles
Enrolment, 
finance data, and 
standardized tests
Inputs, processes, and 
outputs
School with itself 
and other schools
Ministry of  
Education
School profile
Pakistan – PESRP 
School Report Card
EMIS Inputs, processes, and 
outputs
Standard and 
school with itself
Provincial  
government
School report
Mexico – School 
Report Card
Standardized tests Learning outcomes School with itself 
and other schools
Ministry of  
Education
School report
Tanzania – PSLE 
School-Level Report
Primary and 
Secondary Leaving 
Exam Results
Learning outcomes Other schools and 
school with itself
Ministry of  
Education
School ranking
USA – Virginia 
School Report Card
State-wide standard 
student learning 
assessments
Learning outcomes, 
inputs (teacher quality) 
and school safety 
indicators
Standard, school 
with itself, other 
schools
Virginia 
Department 
of Education
School report
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Process Name of SRC Data sources Content Comparison Publisher of 
SRC
Format of 
SRC
Bottom-up India – Pratham 
School Report Card
Results of parent 
and community 
visits 
Inputs and processes Other schools Pratham State-level report
Indonesia – 
Community 
Scorecard
Community 
monitoring and 
teacher self-
reporting (by 
submitting photos 
via mobile phone)
Processes, parent 
satisfaction, and other 
community-devised 
indicators
Between teachers 
within one school
TNP2K/TNP2K 
and communities
Community 
scorecard
Malawi – SPR 
School Feedback 
Report
School observation 
by school inspectors 
and head teachers
Inputs, processes, 
outputs, and parent 
satisfaction
Standard LINK Malawi 
and communities
School feedback 
report
Nigeria – Citizen 
Report Card
Survey and focus 
group discussions 
among community 
members
Inputs and processes None LITE Africa Survey report
Rwanda – 
Community 
Scorecard
Community scoring 
exercise and focus 
group discussions
Inputs and processes Standard Transparency 
International  
Rwanda
Scorecard
Uganda – CVA 
Community Score 
Card
Community 
observation and 
perception
Participant decided – 
varies by community
Standard (decided 
by communities)
World Vision  
Uganda and 
communities
Scorecard
Note: Pakistan is the only country to use a top-down approach to encourage public participation. SRCs are generated at the central 
district government using EMIS data. 
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Figure 2.6 Uganda CVA Community Score Card
Source: World Vision Uganda (Sample of the community scorecard for health facilities). 
2.3 Summary and comparison of key SRC design features
To better compare the similarities and differences of SRCs, this section 
summarizes their main design features (Tables  2.5 and 2.6) and further 
compares their content and types of comparison (Figures 2.7  and 2.8). 
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Figure  2.7 Mapping school report cards by content
Inputs Inputs and 
processes
Outputs Inputs, processes, 
and outputs
Inputs, processes, 
outputs, and parent 
satisfaction
India
Nigeria
Rwanda
Indonesia
Malawi
Uganda
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Tanzania
Ghana
Guatemala
Pakistan
US-Virginia
Note: In the cases of Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda, communities have the autonomy to design their 
own indicators to gauge school quality, which can potentially include all aspects of schooling. 
Figure 2.8 Mapping school report cards by comparison
None Other 
schools
Standard Standard  
and other 
schools
Other schools 
and school  
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Standard and 
school with  
Itself 
Standard, school 
with itself and 
other schools 
Ghana
Nigeria
Indonesia
Malawi
Rwanda
Uganda
Guatemala
Mexico
Tanzania
Brazil 
Colombia
Pakistan
US-
Virginia
India
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Chapter 3
School report cards: Level of accountability  
and transparency 
The previous chapters examined the purpose, content, and distribution of 
school report cards in different contexts. This chapter focuses on the specific 
issue of accountability and transparency, and examines the question: Do all 
school report card models contribute to transparency and accountability in 
a country’s local or national education system. And, if so, how? To answer 
these questions, the authors created an index of transparency and 
accountability, as it relates to school report cards, with the aim of identifying 
which elements of school-level information lead to accountability and 
transparency in the education system. 
3.1 The accountability and transparency index
Before creating the accountability and transparency index, it was necessary 
to define the two concepts. According to Arcia et al. (2011), accountability 
refers to ‘the acceptance of responsibility and being answerable for one’s 
action’. Lewis and Pettersson (2009) define accountability as ‘the act of 
holding public officials and service providers answerable for processes and 
outcomes, and imposing penalties if specified outputs and outcomes are not 
delivered’. Clear roles and responsibilities, as well as established rules and 
consequences, are key elements found in various definitions. In the context 
of school management, for example, accountability may include ‘the act of 
compliance with the rules and regulations of school governance … reporting 
to those with oversight authority over the school [and] linking rewards and 
sanctions to expected results’ (Arcia et al., 2011). 
Multiple actors can typically hold schools accountable. The central 
government is one important monitoring agent, but it is also reasonable to 
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expect that local communities will exert pressure on service providers when 
information on performance is accessible (Figlio and Loeb, 2011). 
Parents with children in school are not the only ones concerned with 
the improvement of school quality in the community. While parents usually 
care about school quality as far as it directly relates to their child’s education 
attainment and progression, the intentions of community members who are 
not parents may be more altruistic. In particular, as potential future parents, 
community members may have a longer vision for the development of 
education in local schools than those with children already in the system. 
When acting together, parents and communities at large can exert significant 
pressure on service providers through demands for proper education service 
delivery.
Transparency on the other hand, involves ‘clear and public disclosure of 
information, rules, plans, processes and actions by governments, companies, 
organizations and individuals. It is the principle that public affairs need to 
be conducted in the open’ (Transparency International, 2011). In the 
education sector, transparency requires ‘clear information that is easy to 
understand and simple to access by all stakeholders on all flows of educational 
resources’ (Hallak and Poisson, 2007). Transparency and accountability 
appear to be interlinked, as the transparency of information may serve as an 
important means to achieving accountability. However, the disclosure of 
information – while valuable in and of itself – may or may not increase the 
accountability of the education system. 
Bearing in mind these definitions of the two key terms, the study 
identified key components of SRCs which are directly linked to the concepts 
of accountability and transparency. It then examined the extent to which 
these elements are incorporated into SRCs developed through the formal 
system and the public participation model. 
The study developed an index based on six indicators and mapped the 
14 SRC country cases accordingly (Table 3.1). The first four indicators each 
examine a different aspect of SRCs to determine the extent to which they 
can be considered transparent. The first two examine whether results are 
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shared with the public and community (i.e. service users), as well as with 
the oversight authority (i.e. local or central education offices). Ideally, both 
sets of actors should be informed of school performance results, as both have 
the potential to exert pressure on service providers (i.e.  schools) to hold 
them accountable for their performance. Because of the large number of 
illiterate parents in developing countries, the third and fourth indicators 
examine the extent to which SRC information is accessible in terms of 
presentation and distribution. The last two indicators are more directly 
related to accountability. They are used to explore whether SRCs help to 
further distribute roles and responsibilities between stakeholders in the 
education service, and whether schools face positive or negative consequences 
as a result of their performance. 
What does the Transparency and Accountability Index show? 
The following analysis synthesizes the level of transparency and accountability 
of SRCs according to the six indicators developed in the index. 
Are SRC results shared with the public/community? 
Yes. In both formal systems and bottom-up approaches, SRC results are shared 
with the community or the general public. Interestingly, in the top-down 
approaches SRC results are usually shared online, while bottom-up SRCs are 
distributed during briefings or group meetings. The different channels through 
which SRC information is made available affect the amount of information 
that actually reaches the intended audience. For low-income groups, lack of 
access to the Internet, as well as lack of awareness of the existence of such 
information, may hinder access to online SRC databases. In addition, where 
information is available online, it is hard to establish the proportion of the 
target audience that receives the data. Conversely, group meetings – a common 
feature of bottom-up approaches – help to ensure that SRC data reach the 
intended audience by debriefing community members about the results. 
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Are SRC results shared with the oversight authority? 
Yes. Oversight authorities act as organizers of SRC data collection and 
distribution for all top-down approaches. In addition, information must reach 
the education authorities in order to facilitate the decision-making process – a 
key objective of top-down SRCs. Among the bottom-up approaches, it is 
noteworthy that all country cases have tried to engage with government 
agencies, in part by sharing the SRC results with them. In Malawi, for example, 
SRC results are shared with the district education office to facilitate the official 
school appraisal cycle. In Uganda, SRC results are shared with the local 
education department, which enables consideration of school performance as 
part of the school budget planning and allocation process. 
Is the information presentation easily understandable? 
The comprehensibility of SRCs varies. Among top-down SRCs some 
governments (e.g.  Colombia and Guatemala) present information online 
with visual cues and colour coding to facilitate interpretation of the 
information, while others produce SRCs comprising lengthy and complicated 
school indicator tables (e.g. Virginia in the United States), making it harder 
for the general public to understand the available information.
More innovative presentations of information are found among bottom-
up SRCs. For example, the participatory nature of the Ugandan Community 
Scorecard allows community members to use vivid symbols to represent 
school indicators, as well as ‘smiling face’ scales to gauge school performance. 
Indonesia also enables community members to decide upon the indicators 
in the scorecards and make the presentation of information more relevant. 
However, not all bottom-up SRCs comprise easy-to-understand information, 
as this depends partly on the data collection process involved and the main 
target audience. In Malawi, for example, school principals and district 
education officers conduct the school visits and complete school feedback 
reports with technical recommendations for a set of school performance 
indicators. Because one of the main purposes of a school feedback report is 
to provide professional feedback and improvement plans for schools, the 
content is less accessible to the general public. However, the public is made 
aware of school performance during group meetings. 
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Table 3.1 Index for accountability and transparency in school report cards
Country Are results 
shared with 
the public/
community?
Are results 
shared with 
the oversight 
authority?
Is the 
presentation 
of information 
easily 
understandable?
Is information 
actively discussed 
and distributed?
Are roles and 
responsibilities 
further 
established or 
clarified?
Are 
consequences 
established?
Formal systems
Brazil Y (Yes) – available 
online
Y N (No) Distributed to each 
school but not 
necessarily discussed 
TBD Y
Colombia Y – available 
online
Y Y (with symbols 
and colour coding)
Supposedly Y Y
Ghana Y – partially (in 
the headmaster’s 
office)
Y N Supposedly Y N
Guatemala Y – available 
online
TBD Y (with 
visualization and 
simple statements)
TBD TBD N
Mexico Y – posted in 
public
TBD Y (with visual cues) N N N
Pakistan Y – available 
online
Y Y Supposedly (through 
parent–teacher 
meetings) but not 
enforced
TBD N
Tanzania Y – available 
online
Y The league table 
concept is easy, but 
requires literacy
TBD TBD N 
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Country Are results 
shared with 
the public/
community?
Are results 
shared with 
the oversight 
authority?
Is the 
presentation 
of information 
easily 
understandable?
Is information 
actively discussed 
and distributed?
Are roles and 
responsibilities 
further 
established or 
clarified?
Are 
consequences 
established?
United 
States
Y – available 
online
Y N TBD N Y
Public participation models
India Y – available 
online
Y Not for illiterate 
parents
Y – with education 
authority and CSOs
Y N
Indonesia Y Y Y (through oral 
discussion)
Y (through oral 
discussion)
Y Y (through service 
agreement)
Malawi Y – during school 
appraisal meetings
Y Y (through oral 
discussion)
Y Y Y 
Nigeria – 
Delta State
Y – facilitators 
debrief the 
community
Y Y (through oral 
discussion)
Y (in community 
meetings)
Y N
Rwanda Y – group 
discussions
Y N Y Y N
Uganda Y – during 
community 
meetings
Y Y (through a scale 
of smiling faces 
and other visual 
cues)
Y Y N
Note: TBD = to be decided. It applies to situations in which the study was unable to obtain information on certain aspects of SRC 
practices. For example, it proved impossible to evaluate the extent of discussion of the results of some top-down SRC cases. 
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Is information actively discussed and distributed? 
The results of this indicator vary and depend largely on whether the SRC 
model is top-down or bottom-up. In almost all bottom-up approaches, 
information is made comprehensible through discussions, debates, and 
explanations, and is therefore more accessible to a wider audience. Most of 
the top-down approaches do not offer opportunities for further discussion 
of information. The exceptions are Colombia, Ghana, and Mexico. In 
Colombia, schools and teachers are encouraged to discuss their school’s 
performance during a designated time known as Excellence Day. In Ghana, 
SRC results are employed as inputs for community members to make school 
management decisions during school performance appraisal meetings. In 
Mexico, school directors are required to share the SRC results every two 
months with members of the council of school participation and PTAs. 
Are roles and responsibilities further established and clarified?
Since the clarification of roles and responsibilities is a prerequisite for 
accountability measures in education, the study examined whether SRCs 
further clarify the roles and responsibilities for each education stakeholder. 
As Table 3.1 illustrates, the bottom-up approach shows the most potential 
for clarifying the types of contribution expected from each stakeholder. The 
more those stakeholders discuss the issues they encounter in terms of school 
performance, the more they voice their needs and demands. For example, 
pupils better understand the importance of arriving at school on time, and 
teachers better clarify the responsibility of parents to properly feed their 
children. In the case of top-down approaches, unless additional built-in 
structures exist to support and ensure the dissemination of SRC information, 
merely posting the information online limits the possibility of further 
clarification of roles and responsibilities. 
Are consequences established?
For this indicator, top-down SRCs have a distinct advantage in terms of 
establishing real consequences to ensure that schools and other stakeholders 
change behaviours to improve education quality. This is not surprising given 
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that governments have both the authority to enforce certain regulations, and the 
financial resources to grant rewards or impose sanctions. In contrast, communities 
have less leverage to ensure participation and action from service providers or 
the government as they lack the same level of authority and resources. However, 
because bottom-up SRCs are implemented closest to education service 
providers, they have the advantage of more frequent and detailed school 
monitoring, and are able to exert greater social pressure than top-down SRCs. 
Figure 3.1 Level of accountability and transparency for SRCs in featured 
countries
Note: Malawi is placed on the border between soft and hard accountability models because SRC 
information is used to decide on indicators for school improvement plans to be evaluated in the following 
year. However, there is no explicit link between performance and rewards or punishments. Pakistan borders 
the two transparency dimensions as discussion of SRC information is encouraged but not enforced.
The Accountability and Transparency Dimensions Chart
Figure 3.1 further compares the level of transparency and accountability of 
the SRC country cases according to a four-dimensional scale. In terms of the 
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transparency index, it examines whether school-level information is posted, 
or is posted and further discussed. In terms of the accountability index, it 
assesses the presence of ‘soft accountability’ through clarification of roles 
and responsibilities or enhanced social monitoring, or ‘hard accountability’ 
through linking rewards and/or punishments to school results in different 
SRCs. There is no evidence to suggest that one dimension of accountability 
or transparency is necessarily better than the other, but the categorization 
helps to shed light on the different practices in SRCs, as well as overall trends 
among the 14 country cases. 
Most of the countries have yet to establish ‘hard accountability’ models, 
as they have not linked school performance with concrete actions to provide 
technical assistance to reward or punish schools. Most of the bottom-up 
country cases do post and discuss information in SRCs, whereas the majority 
of top-down SRCs post information publicly without necessarily ensuring 
the general public’s comprehension. 
3.2   School report card practices for accountability and transparency
In terms of data presentation and accessibility, it seems the most promising 
models are those in which the results of school report cards are openly 
communicated and discussed during community gatherings with multiple 
stakeholders. In-person meetings help illiterate parents better understand 
school performance, and the participatory nature of the community gathering 
format further helps establish roles and responsibilities more directly in the 
presence of all stakeholders at one time. 
In Malawi, for example, after handing out the reports to schools, a school 
appraisal meeting is held with the participation of community members, 
head teachers, SMC members, village leaders, and students. During this 
meeting, the head teacher presents the findings of the school feedback report 
and then opens up the meeting for a discussion to enable community 
members to ask questions on related issues. 
In the case of Uganda’s Citizen Voice and Action initiative, stakeholders 
– including parents and teachers – are able to better understand their role in 
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contributing to children’s education as they participate as equals in a 
discussion of school performance based on a set of indicators determined 
by themselves. For example, when teacher absenteeism is raised as an issue, 
teachers feel a greater sense of responsibility because they are directly 
monitored by the community. At the same time, parents better understand 
that although tuition is free under the Free Primary Education Act, they are 
still expected to pay for pupils’ books and stationery.34
While not all countries have measures in place to ensure data accessibility 
specifically for parents and the local community, all countries provide data 
to the local or central education authority. It appears that accessibility of 
information varies and depends on the distribution process, as well as the 
high-stakes or low-stakes nature of the regulation. For example, in Colombia 
and Pakistan, although schools are encouraged to display results in a public 
space, the lack of formal regulations or sanctions established by the central 
authority means that schools do not necessarily follow this recommendation. 
School leaders either assume that the public lacks the capacity to understand 
the information, or regard public accessibility to information as a threat to 
their position. Interestingly, in Colombia, private schools are said to more 
actively undertake the school performance review process recommended by 
the government, as the resulting increase in enrolments provides an incentive 
to improve school quality. 
In terms of the accountability indicators, most of the country practices 
in SRCs have yet to establish effective mechanisms to further clarify roles 
and responsibilities for each stakeholder. Additionally, most countries 
continue to struggle with both the provision of information and linking 
school performance with clear consequences in terms of rewards and 
punishment. 
Table 3.2 further analyses school practices in terms of accountability by 
presenting the similarities and differences in accountability measures built 
into SRCs in the 14 countries, according to four dimensions developed below. 
34. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a lot of Ugandan parents misinterpret the Free Primary Education Act and do not 
pay for textbooks or stationery. In such cases, pupils have to attend classes without adequate learning materials. 
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Table 3.2 Further analysis of accountability approaches
Country Type of 
accountability
Level of 
accountability
Who is/are held 
accountable
Corruption Consequences
Brazil Pedagogical National authority Schools NA Technical and/or 
financial assistance to 
low-performing schools 
Colombia Pedagogical National authority Schools NA Financial rewards 
starting in 2016
Ghana Pedagogical, 
management, and 
financial
National authority Schools Resource 
contributions to the 
schools
SRCs are a prerequisite 
for school capitation 
grants
Guatemala Pedagogical and 
financial
National authority Schools School financial 
allocation
None
Mexico Pedagogical National authority Schools NA None
Tanzania Pedagogical National authority Schools NA None
USA – 
Virginia
Pedagogical State authority Schools NA Potential loss of 
accreditation and 
students
India Pedagogical and 
financial
School Schools and districts Disbursement of 
school grant
None
Indonesia Pedagogical and 
financial
School and local/
district authority
School principals, 
teachers and parents; 
the local government
Teacher attendance, 
management of 
school operational 
fund, and 
disbursement of 
World Bank funds
District governments 
are encouraged to 
link teacher pay with 
teacher performance
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Country Type of 
accountability
Level of 
accountability
Who is/are held 
accountable
Corruption Consequences
Malawi 
– Dedza 
District
Pedagogical, 
financial, and 
management 
Local authority and 
school 
Schools managers, 
head teachers, 
teachers, and 
communities
Financial 
management of the 
schools
Evaluation (but no 
tangible consequences)
Nigeria – 
Delta Region
Pedagogical and 
financial
School Schools, teachers, and 
the local government
Teacher attendance Officials are encouraged 
to make formal 
statements about school 
improvement (but no 
tangible consequences)
Pakistan 
– Punjab 
Province
Pedagogical, 
financial, and 
management
Local authority Schools, school 
councils, and donor 
Disbursement of 
school non-budgetary 
budget
None
Rwanda Pedagogical, 
financial, and 
management
School Ministry of Education, 
schools managers, 
parents, teachers, and 
students
Use of funds from 
capitation grants
None
Uganda Pedagogical and 
Management
School and local 
authority 
Head teachers, 
teachers, parents, and 
pupils
Teacher attendance Potential budget 
adjustment based on 
performance
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Hallak and Poisson (2007) state that ‘a workable, defensible 
accountability system requires the involvement of different stakeholders and 
a clear specification of who is accountable, to whom, for what and with what 
consequences’. On this basis of this definition of an effective accountability 
system, the accountability models are further categorized and described in 
line with the following dimensions: 
• Types of accountability emphasized in the SRCs based on their content. The 
major types of accountability models found among the SRC cases 
include pedagogical accountability, financial accountability, and 
management accountability. 
• The level (of education stakeholders) at which accountability is ‘generated’. In 
other words, who is responsible for initiating and implementing SRCs 
in terms of data collection, SRC distribution, and potentially imposing 
consequences.
• The stakeholders held accountable according to the content of SRCs. If an SRC 
focuses only on the performance of a school, then schools are held 
accountable. If an SRC also examines financial distribution by district 
governments, for example, then district governments are also held 
accountable. 
• Whether consequences are established as an integral part of the accountability 
model, and if so, the nature of those consequences. 
The findings of the analysis on approaches to accountability in SRCs 
in different countries are summarized in Table 3.2. 
3.3 What do the accountability approaches reveal?
Combination of models
The SRC cases in the 14 countries featured in this report present many 
combinations of accountability models:
• Pedagogical: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Tanzania, and USA-Virginia;
• Pedagogical and financial: Guatemala, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria-
Delta Region;
• Pedagogical and management: Uganda;
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• Pedagogical, financial, and management: Ghana, Malawi-Dedza District, 
Pakistan-Punjab Province, and Rwanda.
Pedagogical accountability is created when SRCs include data on 
student learning outcomes. As Hallak and Poisson (2007) note, education 
systems generally ‘are held responsible for the quality of their products, 
namely students’ knowledge, skills, behaviours and performance’. It is not 
surprising therefore that all the SRCs in this report focus either solely or 
partly on student learning outcomes in individual schools. 
Financial accountability and management accountability are 
emphasized in countries where schools are held accountable for the correct 
use of their finances and effective management. In terms of financial 
accountability, the SRCs featured in this report focus mainly on the 
disbursement of school funds from central or local education authorities. 
For example, in Rwanda, the Ministry of Education is held accountable for 
the timely disbursement of capitation grants. In Nigeria, the local and central 
authorities are also held accountable for the provision of free primary 
education. In India, the government is held accountable for the disbursement 
of school grants. 
Schools themselves can be also held accountable for the operation and 
allocation of school funds. For example, the Guatemala SRC reports the 
resource allocation of schools for each school programme, as well as the 
intended beneficiaries. In Indonesia, some teachers are demanding 
transparency in school operation funds from school headmasters through 
the SRC process. In Rwanda, the SRC assesses the effective use of capitation 
grants by schools, the transparency of usage, and the level of satisfaction 
among the community with regard to free access to education as a result of 
the grant. 
Malawi’s SRC presents a more comprehensive financial accountability 
model, as schools are held accountable for keeping up-to-date financial 
records and making financial documentation transparent and accessible. 
School management committees are held accountable for monitoring school 
expenditure. Table 3.3 presents the financial section of a school feedback 
report. 
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Table 3.3 The financial section of Malawi’s SRC
6.  Planning and 
organization
Partially 
achieved
• Availability of School Improvement Plan
• School records kept on school premises and are easily 
accessible
• No minutes of staff meetings
• School records not updated
7.  Financial 
management 
Partially 
achieved
• SMC monitors expenditures
• The school has a cashbook
• Little transparency in financial matters
• No recruitment of auxiliary teachers, though there is a need
Source: Link Community Development Malawi, www.lcdinternational.org.
The Malawi school feedback report also provides an example of a 
comprehensive management accountability model. Head teachers are held 
accountable for the supervision of teaching and learning, staff deployment 
and development, and the monitoring of staff attendance and punctuality. 
SMCs are also held accountable for the regular reporting of school matters 
to parents and the monitoring of financial expenditure. 
In Pakistan, schools are held accountable for teacher hiring, as the SRC 
checks the number of teachers schools plan to hire versus the actual number 
of teachers hired. The SRC also holds school council members accountable 
for the number of meetings they hold. Ghana’s SRC holds community 
members accountable by checking the frequency of PTA meetings. In 
Rwanda, the SRC reports the level of involvement in school management of 
all education stakeholders, including teachers, parents, and pupils. Service 
providers including head teachers and local education authorities are also 
held accountable for school visits and contributions to school management. 
In Uganda, the working team debriefs the government about findings from 
community-generated SRCs, so as to facilitate the budgeting and policy 
planning session. This practice also increases government accountability for 
more reasonable budget allocations, as it provides more evidence for 
decision-making. 
85
School report cards: Level of accountability and transparency
Primary actors
According to the analysis of SRCs presented here, the primary actors held 
accountable are schools (including principals and teachers). However, in a 
number of cases local and central education authorities may also be held 
accountable. In Indonesia, for example, TNP2K encourages local 
governments to link teacher performance with teacher pay, thus making them 
potentially accountable for facilitating the hiring of qualified teachers. In 
Nigeria, LITE shares community perception survey results with local 
government agencies and encourages them to make formal statements about 
school improvement plans, thereby holding them accountable. In Rwanda, 
the Ministry of Education is accountable for the allocation of capitation 
grants. In Pakistan, the SRC reports the disbursement of non-salary financial 
resources for which it receives funding, thereby holding the donor (the World 
Bank) accountable. 
In Uganda and Rwanda, accountability also extends to students in terms 
of participation in school management, regular school attendance, and (in 
Uganda) fulfilling their duties as pupils. These SRC practices recognize that 
student behaviour is an essential determinant of school performance, and 
provide the means for pupils to participate in the discussion and management 
of school matters. 
Consequences
The majority of countries studied in this report have not linked SRC results 
with concrete actions. The exceptions are Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, and the 
United States. Countries that implement ‘soft’ consequences are Indonesia, 
Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, and Uganda. 
The Brazilian government has linked financial rewards and technical 
assistance with school results through IDEB, providing the 1,000 lowest-
performing municipalities with extra resources and the remaining low-
performing municipalities with technical support. The Colombia Ministry 
of Education has also started linking financial rewards with school 
performance in its school excellence report. To further hold schools 
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accountable, the Ministry encourages schools to sign an ‘agreement to 
excellence’ action plan in coordination with local education offices following 
discussion among teachers and school staff. In the state of Virginia, the federal 
government requires schools to develop an improvement plan if they do not 
meet the minimum pass rate for one or more student subgroups. Schools 
that do not meet state accreditation standards are also subject to academic 
reviews and are required to submit a school improvement plan. In Ghana, 
preparation and availability of the SRC is a prerequisite for schools to receive 
a school capitation grant.
Among the bottom-up approaches, Malawi links the results of the school 
feedback report to school planning, with stakeholders deciding together on 
six priorities for the school improvement plan,35 which is then evaluated the 
following year in the school performance review process. In Nigeria, the 
Citizen Report Card process involves government officials in the release of 
citizen scorecards, by encouraging them to make formal statements about 
their plans to improve public service delivery. In Indonesia, the TNP2K 
taskforce works closely with communities and district governments, with a 
view to encouraging governments to link teacher pay to teacher performance 
as scored by community members. 
Consequences in accountability models serve an important function 
by providing direct incentives for education service providers to improve 
their services. However, such consequences may not necessarily lead to 
improvement, for example, if schools do not have access to the necessary 
expertise or resources. Conversely, schools may not necessarily require hard 
consequences to change their behaviours. In the state of Colima in Mexico, 
SRC practice focuses on providing professional assistance in the interpretation 
of student learning assessment results in the SRC, as well as guiding teachers 
through the pedagogical adjustments needed in accordance with the results. 
Research shows that these efforts alone help to improve school performance 
in terms of learning outcomes (de Hoyos, Garcia-Moreno, and Patrinos, 
2015). Examples in Uganda and Malawi also show that greater community 
35. Each school is supposed to develop a school improvement plan on an annual basis. The government provides basic 
guidelines, such as stipulating that schools ensure access, equity, quality, relevance, resources, etc. 
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involvement and increased pressure generated through public monitoring 
have the potential to improve schools.
3.4 The anti-corruption element of school report cards 
This section examines the potential for SRCs to assist in the fight against 
corrupt practices in school management. Hallak and Poisson (2007) define 
corruption in the education sector as the ‘systematic use of public office for 
private benefit, whose impact is significant on the availability and quality of 
educational goods and services, and, has a consequence on access, quality 
or equity in education’. Corruption is still rampant in education services in 
many developing countries. Transparency International notes that education 
is especially prone to corruption as the sector usually accounts for at least 
30 per cent of a country’s national budget.36 
To gauge the extent of corruption in the education sector for each 
country, the study referenced data from Transparency International’s largest 
public opinion survey, the Global Corruption Barometer 2013. This survey 
asked more than 114,000 people from 107 countries for their view on 
corruption in public sectors. Figure  3.2 presents the data for most of the 
countries in this report and shows the percentage of respondents who 
perceived education as ‘corrupt or extremely corrupt’.37 As can be seen, there 
is great variance by country. For example, while only 4 per cent of respondents 
in Rwanda perceived the education sector as corrupt, this figure rose to more 
than 70 per cent in Malawi and Tanzania. 
In the countries reviewed for this study, SRCs are not used as an explicit 
anti-corruption tool. However, in a few cases it was possible to gain some 
insight into how countries may be using SRCs to enhance the integrity of 
the education process and decrease corruption in their education systems. 
According to Hallak and Poisson (2007), education planning and 
management presents a series of ‘major opportunities for corruption’, 
including finance, school construction, teacher behaviour, information 
36. See www.transparency.org/topic/detail/education.
37. Out of the 14 countries featured in this report, only Guatemala is not included in the Global Corruption Barometer. 
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systems, examinations, and the awarding of diplomas. The study identified 
SRC practices that demonstrate promising ways of combating corruption in 
three areas: finance, teacher behaviour, and information systems. 
Figure 3.2 Public perception of education corruption by country
Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Transparency International.
SRC practices to identify and prevent corruption in finance
Corruption in school finance can occur at different levels. Education 
authorities may fail to disburse funding to schools adequately or in a timely 
manner, and schools in turn may not allocate the financial resources to the 
intended areas. School finance also consists of wage items and non-wage 
items. While corruption in wage items would elicit direct complaints from 
teachers, corruption in non-wage items can sometimes go unnoticed. 
‘Although schools typically know that they are entitled to some funding, 
school communities neither know exactly what they are entitled to receive, 
nor can accurately estimate the value of the in-kind support they get, since 
the resources reaching them are predominantly in-kind, without any 
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indication of monetary values’ (Hallak and Poisson, 2007). Embezzlement 
of school operational funds has significant consequences, including delayed 
teacher payments, extra school fees for parents, and reduced funding to 
schools.
The countries featured in the report have deployed a variety of 
techniques in their SRC practices to prevent corruption at various levels. To 
identify and prevent funding leakages from the central level to schools, several 
SRCs have publicly posted information on the amount of funding schools 
are supposed to receive in comparison with the amount they actually receive. 
For example, India’s Pratham SRC lists the number and percentage of schools 
that receive school improvement grants from the Indian government. The 
schools are entitled to three types of school improvement grant: a school 
maintenance grant for minor repairs and infrastructure maintenance, a school 
development grant for purchasing school and office equipment, and a teacher 
learning material grant (see Table  3.4). According to the SRC results, in 
2013/2014, 4 per cent to 6 per cent of schools were unaware of the existence 
of these grants or whether they received them. In the Punjab Province of 
Pakistan, the SRC also holds one of their donors, the World Bank, accountable 
by including information on the disbursement and usage of the related non-
salary budget for each school. 
In Nigeria, the citizen report card verifies outcomes resulting from the 
disbursement of school funds by surveying parents about whether they pay 
for education. Under Nigerian education law, primary education is supposed 
to be free, with funding from the federal, state, and local government level. 
In addition, several SRCs have worked to hold schools accountable for 
the proper allocation of resources, by making the usage and outcome of 
school funds more transparent. Guatemala’s school profile lists the amount 
of school funding for specific school programmes, as well as the intended 
beneficiaries. Rwanda’s community scorecard further examines the effective 
use of the capitation grant by including teachers’ and parents’ perception of 
funding outcomes, including the availability of qualified teachers and the 
community’s degree of satisfaction with the level of access to free education. 
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Table 3.4 School financing table of Pratham’s school report card, 2014
% Schools that report receiving SSA grants – full financial year
SSA school 
grants
April 2011 to March 2012 April 2013 to March 2014
Number of 
schools
% schools
Number of 
schools
% schools
Yes No Don’t know Yes No
Don’t 
know
Maintenance 
grant 14 305 86.5 7.4 6.2 14 953 79.6 15.1 5.3
Development 
grant 14 165 79.0 13.9 7.1 14 870 67.5 26.0 6.5
Teacher 
learning 
material grant
14 319 89.1 6.7 4.2 14 685 17.8 78.0 4.3
Source: Pratham.
SRC practices to identify and prevent corruption in teacher 
behaviour
Teacher absenteeism is perceived as a form of corruption, as teachers are not 
performing the duties for which they are paid. Teacher absenteeism also has 
direct consequences on student attendance and learning outcomes. One 
study found that ‘a 10 per cent increase in teacher absence is associated with 
a 1.8 per cent decrease in student attendance; and that a 20 per cent decrease 
in teacher attendance is associated with a 2 per cent decrease in test scores’ 
(Kremer et al., 2005). 
Some country cases highlighted promising ways of combating teacher 
absenteeism. For example, Indonesia’s SRC model addresses teacher 
absenteeism from multiple angles: it enhances the tracking of teacher 
attendance through self-reporting and social monitoring, works to change 
community perception regarding teacher behaviours, and encourages 
consequences linked to teacher behaviours. To enhance the monitoring of 
teacher attendance, Indonesia employs an innovative Android app, which 
requires each teacher to submit a photo of themselves at school on a daily 
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basis. The attendance record for each teacher is reported to the user 
committee and the district education office, and published to the entire 
village to enhance transparency in teacher behaviour. To further increase 
social pressure on teachers, members of the user committee monitor teacher 
attendance on a monthly basis. In order to overcome the traditional belief 
that teachers are authoritative figures that should not be challenged by 
communities, the taskforce also discloses the amount of allowances teachers 
receive in remote villages, so that community members feel more compelled 
to hold well-paid teachers accountable. 
Figure 3.3 Android app for tracking teacher attendance in Indonesia
Source: Dewi Susanti, TNP2K.
SRC practices to identify and prevent corruption in information 
systems
Another issue some SRCs intentionally address during the data collection 
process is corruption in information systems. According to Hallak and 
Poisson (2007), a notable form of malpractice in school management is the 
‘manipulation of school data, especially by the head teacher, in order to obtain 
more funds or special allowances’. When certain aspects of school-level 
information are linked with funding or punishment, school principals may 
have an incentive to either dishonestly report information, or collude with 
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data inspectors to fabricate information. For example, school enrolment 
numbers are often associated with funding, which can entice school principals 
to over-report these figures. SRC programmes can work to prevent this 
practice by making improvements to the design of the data reporting and 
inspection system. 
Some countries have implemented processes specifically aimed at 
increasing data integrity and preventing corruption. In Pakistan, school 
inspectors rotate the schools they inspect each month to decrease the 
likelihood of collusion-based corruption. The school inspection date is also 
assigned randomly to help ensure that school observation data more closely 
reflects reality. In Malawi, data collectors dispatched to conduct school 
observations for school feedback reports also verify the accuracy of the 
enrolment information self-reported by schools. These innovative yet discreet 
elements of the school report card process offer interesting lessons on how 
deliberate consideration of corruption issues in education systems can lead 
to a better designed and more effective SRC system.   
93
Chapter 4
Promising models and prevalent issues 
from country cases 
This chapter focuses on two questions: What measures or elements of SRCs 
show particular promise for mobilizing communities or holding schools 
accountable? And what problems typically emerge in the implementation 
of SRCs and are worthy of special attention and discussion? Since none of 
the countries studied have been externally evaluated, the following discussion 
is based primarily on insights drawn from interviews or surveys with 
programme implementers and policy researchers. 
4.1 Promising country models and elements for transparency 
and accountability
Promising country models for transparency and accountability
The 14 country cases featured in this report highlight a number of promising 
approaches for promoting transparency and accountability in education 
systems. In terms of transparency, the Uganda SRC provides a participatory 
model that allows indicators to be widely understood by the community. 
The SRC processes in Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda incorporate all aspects 
of education (inputs, processes, and education outcomes), thereby expanding 
the wealth of available school-level information. In Malawi and Mexico, peers 
or pedagogical advisors provide technical assistance, demonstrating ways to 
make information meaningful, thereby enabling service providers to improve 
school practices. 
SRC practices in Ghana, Malawi, Pakistan, and Rwanda incorporate 
pedagogical, financial and management aspects of accountability. Rwanda, 
in particular, features a promising outcome-based financial accountability 
94
Promoting transparency through information:  
A global review of school report cards
model that examines not only disbursements, but also the perceived 
effectiveness of school grants. Indonesia’s innovative use of technology for 
reporting teacher attendance, combined with established monitoring systems 
in communities, also shows strong potential for promoting positive 
behavioural changes from service providers. Pakistan has also made 
significant efforts to prevent corruption in data collection and reporting, by 
randomizing both data collectors and inspection dates. 
Promising elements for transparency and accountability
Inclusive and participatory approaches provide a true sense of ownership
If implemented well, SRCs serve as a unique channel to encourage education 
stakeholders to make more informed decisions based on school-level data. 
To ensure the ‘buy-in’ of service providers and ‘consumers’, it is essential to 
ensure their participation throughout the entire SRC production and 
distribution process. For example, the SRC approach in Uganda creates a 
sense of ownership among community members, who feel they ‘own’ the 
entire school performance review process and possess decision-making 
power regarding which indicators will be used to gauge school quality. In the 
Malawi case study, community members developed a better sense of 
ownership and realized their right to information, as well as their power to 
realize positive change, through their engagement in the school planning 
process during school appraisal meetings with schools and educators.38 
Inclusiveness is also vital to ensuring true participation. Small focus 
group discussions ensure the participation of community members whose 
voices may otherwise not be represented in a larger group discussion. In the 
Nigerian community scorecard case, the facilitator conducts focus group 
interviews in four groups, so that young men, young women, elder men, and 
elder women all have a say in rating the quality of public service delivery. In 
the Ugandan model, it is noteworthy that the inclusion of pupils helps to 
provide a more rounded perspective of actual performance in schools and 
38. As interview results by Link Malawi show, community members demonstrate a better understanding of school 
quality issues and possess more knowledge regarding how they can better contribute to their children’s education.
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classrooms, as certain issues in the education process will be apparent only 
to learners.39
Buy-in from the government is also central to the success of SRC 
approaches, especially when school-level data feeds into school planning 
and budgeting processes. Malawi provides an example of an approach that 
involves government from the outset. The indicators in the school 
performance review are set by the district education office, which then uses 
the information from school-level data to guide school improvement plans. 
Once school-level results have been distributed, LINK produces reports on 
the whole district with the inclusion of good school practices for other 
schools to emulate. District meetings are held where the manager presents 
the results to all stakeholders, including staff from the Ministry, district 
council members, and school representatives, and then answers questions 
and receives feedback. The data collection and discussion element of the 
process feeds into the district education plan, which is produced every three 
years, with better information leading to better decision-making for the 
schools and the district as a whole.
In the Nigerian case, the report card utilizes the ‘demand side of 
governance’ by providing a channel for citizens to voice opinions, but also 
involves government from the outset. For example, the implementing body 
asks the government to select which communities will be asked to provide 
feedback. The project implementation timeline is also shared with the 
government, to ensure they are aware of the dates of data collection for report 
cards. 
Management of expectations and actions
As Barr et al. (2012) note, the management of expectations and actions is 
particularly important in the education sector. Education is a process that 
requires effort from multiple stakeholders, all of whom influence students’ 
learning. However, each actor’s willingness to contribute to the public good 
39. In the case of Uganda, pupils reported pretending to be sick when late, in order to avoid corporal punishment. This 
helped to raise community awareness of the issue of corporal punishment. 
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depends on anticipation of willingness on the part of others. For example, 
when parents do not actively provide the stationery or textbooks necessary 
for student learning in the classroom, teachers may lose the incentive to 
function as effective instructors. Conversely, collaboration among all 
stakeholders creates incentives for them to further invest in resources or 
actions that improve education.
The Ugandan case provides qualitative examples of ways in which the 
participatory approach may contribute to the ‘coordination of expectations 
and actions’ (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2010). For example, teachers facilitate 
dialogues with parents to make sure they understand the importance of 
providing pupils with textbooks and stationery. Parents can also use these 
dialogues to express the need for school lunches, to avoid sending children 
to school with packed lunches that will spoil, as schools often lack 
refrigeration. Such dialogues sparked by the participation model help to 
motivate all stakeholders involved in student learning to coordinate efforts, 
adjust expectations, and increase their contributions. 
The Malawi SPR model also generates concerted efforts for school 
improvement among schools, community members, and the district 
education authority. For example, discussions led to parents realizing the 
negative consequences of keeping children from school on market days, 
when they were expected to help their parents. Open discussion also helps 
schools form better strategies to work together with communities to address 
educational problems. For example, after the SRC highlighted a gender 
imbalance in schools, some schools developed strategies to visit households 
to educate parents on the importance of girls’ education. 
Use a systematic approach
Linking information with the system is an important aspect of amplifying 
the utility of school-level information. For example, in Malawi the school 
performance review is one component embedded in an organic cycle of 
school planning, budgeting, and improvement. The information from 
Uganda’s community score card also feeds into the school budgeting process 
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by engaging policy-makers and encouraging them to make more evidence-
based decisions. 
Emphasize simplicity in design
In order to achieve transparency, it is important to present information in a 
way that is simple and understandable. For example, the indicators in the 
Uganda CVA report card are represented by ‘smiling face’ graphics rated on 
a scale from one to five. These simple graphics helps the key information to 
stand out. Both Colombia and Tanzania use colour coding, ranking, and 
dashboards to help indicate the effectiveness of schools in a quick and easy 
manner. 
Figure 4.1 Group of men discussing the community report card in 
Uganda
Source: World Vision Uganda.
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4.2 Issues and hurdles
The interview process identified a number of issues and hurdles shared by 
more than one country. Many of these problems echo the literature findings. 
Lack of accountability measures
As noted in the previous section, most SRCs lack effective measures to 
establish accountability. In Colombia, although the central government 
established a ‘Day of Excellence’, not all schools follow through with 
implementation due to a lack of consequences. In several bottom-up 
approaches, community members gain a better understanding of school 
quality through active participation, but may not have sufficient leverage to 
change the behaviour of teachers and principals.
Lack of incentives
Several of the interviewees cited lack of incentive as a major challenge in 
implementing SRCs. In some cases, parents may not possess a sufficiently 
accurate understanding of school quality to demand better service. In 
Pakistan, a survey showed that more than 90 per cent of parents were satisfied 
with the status of education. Similarly in Colombia, more than 80 per cent 
of parents were satisfied with education quality according to a survey result. 
Some parents may not view improvements to education services in the 
community as their responsibility. LITE’s community survey, for example, 
indicated that the majority of the parents believed such improvements were 
the domain of the government and oil companies.40 
40. In the delta region, oil companies often use corporate social responsibility programmes to help build schools. The 
companies usually sign a global memorandum of understanding devoting a grant for infrastructure building 
in the communities. There is therefore some confusion about responsibility over education development. Citizen 
report cards and accompanying meetings also serve as a means to raise citizen awareness of education problems 
and educate them about the distribution of responsibilities in the education sector.
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Lack of capacity
The more participatory the implementation process for school report cards, 
the greater the capacity-building effort required. For example, setting up 
indicators to define and measure teacher quality has proved challenging for 
some villages in the Indonesia Community Scorecard programme. While 
some villages have devised specific and measurable indicators, others vaguely 
define teaching quality as teachers being able to ‘set more homework’. 
Challenge to conventional wisdom
One hurdle in Indonesia is that villagers are not accustomed to challenging 
and confronting teachers, who are considered figures of authority at the 
community level. However, by providing more transparent information about 
the amount of allowances teachers receive, community members become 
aware for the first time of the benefits teachers enjoy and therefore feel more 
entitled to demand better service. 
4.3 A proposed framework for implementing effective school 
report cards 
The literature has proposed various theories of change. It is possible to suggest 
a theory of change that incorporates lessons learned from the field, lessons 
from research studies, and new empirical evidence, to guide future 
implementation of school report cards.
The chain-of-action in information-for-accountability models
Figure 4.2 illustrates the chain of action needed in a successful SRC model 
and key points worth considering for each step. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the five steps needed to implement effective school 
report cards, in order to generate accountability and transparency, and change 
the behaviour of service providers in education. 
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Figure 4.2 Theory of change for effective school report cards
ENABLING ENVIRONMENT
(e.g. school autonomy, centralization vs. decentralization)
STEP 0 STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 STEP 4
Motivation
•  From authorities
•  From service 
providers
•  From service  
users
Data 
collection
• Relevancy
• Accuracy
• Frequency
• Integrity
Data 
distribution
•  Data 
presentation
• Scope of 
audience
Key participants 
take action
• Level of will
• Level of capacity
Service providers 
change behaviour
• Level of pressure
• Consequences faced 
(high vs. low  stakes)
• Available resources
Step 0: Motivation
In the formal sanctions and rewards model, motivation comes from pressure 
on education authorities to demonstrate results in education quality. In the 
public participation model, motivation comes from demands for better 
education from the community. 
Step 1: Data collection
Since availability of information is a key element, the first step is to collect 
data on school quality. In the formal sanctions and rewards model, the content 
of school report cards is usually drawn from EMIS data and standardized 
assessment results. In the public participation model, local organizations and 
community members usually conduct data collection themselves. 
Key aspects include whether the contents of the school report cards are 
relevant, accurate, collected frequently enough, and whether the data-
collection process ensures data integrity. 
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Step 2: Data distribution
After the data on school quality have been collected, the next step is to 
distribute the information to key audiences. In the formal sanctions and 
rewards model, SRCs are distributed mainly to schools and central 
authorities. In the public participation model, SRCs are usually disseminated 
at community meetings where data are actively discussed and then shared 
with regional or national authorities. 
Key aspects include whether the data are presented in an easily 
understandable format, and whether data distribution reaches a wide range 
of audiences. 
Step 3: Key participants take action 
For both models to work, key participants need to take action based on the 
information they receive from the SRCs. In the formal sanctions and rewards 
model, the central authority establishes consequences based on school 
results, rewarding high-performing schools and punishing low-performing 
ones. Some central agencies may also provide schools with technical 
assistance. In the public participation model, community members are 
encouraged to put pressure on schools by actively monitoring school 
performance and management, as well as actively contributing to the 
education of their children. 
Key aspects include whether the key participants have the will to undertake 
action to increase accountability upon receiving SRC information, and whether 
the key participants have the capacity to take the appropriate actions. 
Step 4: Service providers change behaviours 
For school report cards to be effective, it is critical that schools and teachers 
undertake action to improve the management and performance of their 
services. In the formal sanctions and rewards model, schools implement 
actions because of the high-stakes consequences established by central 
authorities. In the public participation model, schools implement actions 
because they are monitored by the public, and are incentivized by the 
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community’s increased willingness to fulfil their role in improving children’s 
learning outcomes. 
Key aspects include whether schools face sufficient pressure to change, 
whether the consequences established carry high or low stakes, and whether 
schools have adequate resources to make the necessary changes. 
Box  4.1 presents a checklist with questions present and future SRC 
implementers should ask in order to form a more systematic understanding 
of the design and potential effectiveness of their programmes. 
4.4 A comparison of two models
This section further illustrates the chain of action for the two models of 
information-for-accountability approaches and compares their advantages 
and disadvantages (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4). 
Comparison 
Public model
Advantages: the public model provides more leeway in data collection, its 
indicators better reflect community demand, the information is more 
understandable to the public and more actively discussed in meeting formats, 
it generates incentives for schools, and it facilitates concerted efforts from 
all stakeholders as schools and parents discuss each other’s needs and 
expectations.
Disadvantages: the public model suffers from a potential lack of pressure 
due to a lack of consequences, and unlike the central ministry, communities 
often lack the resources to punish or reward schools according to their quality.
Formal sanction or reward model
Advantages: the formal sanction or reward model generates systematic 
pressure on schools, and the central authority has more capacity to offer 
technical assistance to low-performing schools.
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Box 4.1 Checklist for a systematic understanding of SRC programmes and 
potential effectiveness
1.  Who decides what kind of information to collect? What is the data source? 
• Is the data collection process participatory?
• Is information in school report cards relevant? 
2.  Who collects the data? 
• How frequently is the data collected?
• Can data integrity be guaranteed? (School self-collection may lead to collusion.)
3.  How is the information presented and distributed?
• Can those with low reading skills easily understand the data? 
• Are data distributed to the wider public and the right audience?
4.  Will stakeholders (consumers and education authorities) take action based on the 
information provided? And, if so, what kind of action? 
• Do stakeholders have enough will to demand the necessary improvements in services?
• Do stakeholders have the capacity to demand the right kind of action to be taken by 
service providers?
5.  Will service providers improve the service upon receiving the information and demands?
• Does the information provide enough accountability? Does increased transparency 
increase pressure on service providers? Are clear links established between 
performance and reward and punishment? 
• Do the service providers have adequate resources to improve service delivery? (For 
example, teacher absenteeism will remain an issue in the absence of sufficient 
accommodation.)
6.  Does the environment at large support the ‘information-for-accountability’ approach? 
• Do service providers have the autonomy and resources to make the changes?
Source: Authors.
Disadvantages: the formal sanction or reward model suffers from a lack 
of flexibility, as the content of school report cards is usually limited to test 
scores and enrolment data, and a lack of transparency, as not all members of 
the public are aware of or will access the online reports.
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Figure 4.3 Chain of action in public participation model
Figure 4.4 Chain of action in formal sanction or rewards model
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Chapter 5
Lessons learned and policy suggestions
The results of this study echo several conclusions arrived at over approximately 
two decades of SRC use. These can be summed up as follows.
Little rigorous research has been undertaken on results and key factors. 
SRCs are part of a complex web of factors influencing education amid a 
multi-stakeholder environment. This creates difficulties when trying to 
ascertain their specific impact. The research does suggest, however, that 
SRCs are an increasingly widely used tool developed as a result of pressure 
for the decentralization of authority and increased parental involvement in 
education.
Pressures in the social sector are prompting stakeholders to demand more 
information about schools and schooling. Democratic political systems tend to 
be huge consumers of information. Improved communication and global 
information flows are leading to an almost uniform rise in expectations for 
services, especially regarding education.
Increased emphasis on ‘data-driven decision-making’ has led more SRCs to 
emphasize comparisons, often at multiple levels. Key examples include Brazil, 
Colombia, Malawi, Pakistan, and Uganda. These comparisons can in turn 
lead to changes in inputs (Brazil), improved budgeting (Malawi), and 
revised funding (Uganda). 
School report cards are a complex undertaking. Whatever the specific aim 
of a report card (e.g. inform a market, enable formal sanctions, or increase 
participation), the implementation of SRCs requires a careful approach 
that depends on several factors:
• Motivation. In more centrist governments motivation is manifest 
through political leadership, while in more decentralized or democratic 
systems it is manifested through the popular will. In either case, clarity 
106
Promoting transparency through information:  
A global review of school report cards
of motivation and consistency continue to matter. For example, in one 
state in Brazil, SRCs were stopped as soon as the state minister of 
education was replaced. However, the experiment led to a nationwide 
SRC effort with broad national support. 
• Clarity and simplicity of information. The more comprehensive and 
notable SRC efforts provide information that can be easily understood 
whether in illustration, simple graph, or chart form. Many clearly cater 
not only to the literate, but also to illiterate parents and communities. 
Standout approaches in this regard include Malawi, Pakistan, and 
Uganda. In addition, the information appears to be provided at 
predictable times and is based on a degree of legitimacy that varies by 
country. Many developing countries are still struggling with the 
integration of bottom-up information through both formal and informal 
channels and top-down information that comes through highly formal 
and often slower information systems. Top-down information is usually 
essential for effective comparisons, but often requires trusted, reliable, 
and organized education information systems.
• Participation and inclusion. These appear to be important elements in 
the longer-term adoption of SRCs. Participation in the actual process 
of developing, understanding, and acting on SRC information at 
multiple levels has been found to be essential to increasing understanding, 
particularly at the community and school levels. This is because such 
participation plays an essential role in the buy-in process, which often 
includes awareness of the capacity-building needs of the intended 
audience. Many audiences, particularly those who are illiterate, may 
lack a full understanding of what certain indicators mean. The question 
most often encountered first when introducing a SRC to a community 
is, ‘What does this mean?’ The second question is frequently, ‘What 
can I do about it?’ Uganda appears to have had the most experience in 
addressing these questions. Pakistan also has long experience in this 
area, even with a top-down approach. 
Ensuring participation is often a much more costly process than 
simply surveying, measuring, and disseminating information. Some 
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countries have not invested the extra time and funds needed to ensure 
participation and understanding. A few countries have attempted to 
increase participation by using existing civil and political mechanisms 
– in part to reduce costs but also to increase legitimacy. Uganda and 
Pakistan appear to have used this approach.
• Systemic approach. A systemic approach that links the capability of a 
central authority (e.g. access to resources, information capacity, a more 
unified political resources/vision) with the recipients’ power 
(e.g.  personal awareness of education needs, increasing desire for 
information, potentially strong desire to improve) is important to the 
most effective of the SRC initiatives reviewed in this study. Efforts that 
are not systematic risk losing sustainability and reducing impact. 
Colombia appears to have understood this need in recent years.
Transparency and accountability. This review indicates that SRCs operate 
very much within the framework of ‘information providing transparency’. 
Providing the public with more information that is accurate and simply 
presented can be considered transparency. Almost all efforts to date to 
create full accountability have had mixed results. Accountability is clearly 
the most difficult part of any systemic change because it can be affected by 
the same multiplicity of factors that affect education. 
Accountability for corruption. As stated in Chapter  3 (Section 4), most 
SRCs focus on student learning outcomes instead of corruption. However, 
SRCs can examine issues such as teacher behaviours and school financing, 
implement deliberate data-collection processes that ensure data integrity, 
and help communities understand, monitor, and discuss education 
practices that are prone to corruption. This makes SRCs a powerful tool 
for increasing transparency and accountability and combating corruption. 
Formal sanctions. According to the index of accountability analysis 
undertaken for this study, formal sanctions help to establish more effective 
consequences, while the participatory approach helps to clarify roles 
and responsibilities and provides more incentives for all stakeholders to 
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contribute to education. It appears that the combination of both provides 
the most promising course to improving accountability.
Moving forward, the following suggestions can be made for SRC 
designers and implementers: 
• Create mechanisms to encourage and ensure public discussion of 
information, as such debate has the potential to hold educators 
accountable, even in the absence of harsh sanctions (top-down SRCs, 
in particular, face challenges of adequate data distribution and 
discussion).
• Present SRC data in meaningful ways by incorporating graphic 
elements, as well as comparisons with standards and other schools, and 
within the school over time.
• Distribute information in a timely and relevant manner. 
• Provide school leaders with technical assistance by sharing best practices 
from schools with similar socioeconomic backgrounds or through 
guidance from peers or pedagogical advisors.
• Make community members and local education authorities responsible 
for distributing information on school performance, rather than school 
principals, who may have less incentive.
• Incorporate more anti-corruption elements into SRCs, such as sharing 
information on potentially corrupt practices and promoting community 
monitoring and dialogue. 
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Annex A: Interviewee list
The country case findings are based on surveys and/or interviews with the 
following individuals: 
Brazil: Sonia Dias, Center for Studies and Research, Culture and Community 
Action (CENPEC)
Colombia: Horacio Alvarez, Inter-American Development Bank
Ghana: Kwame A. A. Agyapong, Project Coordinator, Global Partnership 
for Education Grant, Ghana Education Service; Fred Kweku, Global 
Partnership for Education Grant, Ghana Education Service; Mama Laryea, 
Senior School and Community Engagement Advisor, USAID Ghana 
Partnership for Education – Learning, FHI 360
Guatemala: Ericka Hernández, Director, Planning Office, Ministry of 
Education, Guatemala; Mónica Flores, Director, Directorate General of 
Accreditation and Certification, Ministry of Education, Guatemala; Patricia 
Hernández, Technical Advisor, Bilingual and Intercultural Education Office, 
Ministry of Education, Guatemala
India: Savitri Bobde, Head of Assessment, Pratham 
Indonesia: Dewi Susanti, Lead Research Specialist, Teachers’ Performance 
and Accountability Initiative, National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty 
Reduction (TNP2K)
Malawi: Kate Armstrong, Acting Malawi Programme Director, Link 
International
Mexico: Rafael E. de Hoyos, Senior Economist, Human Development, 
World Bank
Nigeria: Jerry Nwigwe, Senior Programme Manager, LITE-Africa; Austen 
Bisina, LITE-Africa
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Pakistan: Ayesha Khan, World Bank Pakistan; Minahil Asim, former 
Programme Officer with PESRP, Stanford Graduate School of Education
Uganda: Judith Nakamannya, Advocacy Coordinator, World Vision Uganda 
United States: Adria Gallup-Black, Associate Director of Research, FHI 
360 School and Community Services
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Annex B: Survey questions
Which country with school report cards are you describing in this 
survey? 
What is the name of the school report card?
 ❏ School card
 ❏ School report card
 ❏ School profile
 ❏ Other (if so, please enter the name in the text box below) 
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
How long has the school report card been in use?
When did its use begin?
What is the content of the school report card? (You can select multiple 
answers)
 ❏ School inputs (e.g.  the number of students, teachers, textbooks, 
expenditures)
 ❏ Education processes (e.g.  repetition and dropout rates, parental and 
community involvement, school safety)
 ❏ School outputs (e.g. promotion and graduation rates, test scores)
 ❏ Student and parental satisfaction with the school
 ❏ Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
What is the data source for the school report card? 
 ❏ Inspection groups
 ❏ Existing information systems (e.g. EMIS) national or regional data
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 ❏ Self-assessment by school
 ❏ Standardized testing systems
 ❏ Parent and community survey results
 ❏ Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
What are the audiences for the school report card? (You can select 
multiple answers)
 ❏ Central government/Ministry of Education
 ❏ Sub-national education/financial authority
 ❏ Parent and community
 ❏ School
 ❏ Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
What types of comparison are allowed in the school report card? (You 
can select multiple answers)
 ❏ None
 ❏ National or regional standard
 ❏ Other schools
 ❏ School, with itself
 ❏ Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
How often is the school report card distributed? (e.g. once per year)
How are the results of the school report cards distributed? (You can 
select multiple answers)
 ❏ Internal discussion with the school
 ❏ External discussion with the public
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 ❏ Public communication channels (if so, enter the form of communication 
below, e.g. radios, newspapers, graphics, etc.) 
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 ❏ Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
How is the school report card used? (You can select multiple answers)
 ❏ Feedback to schools
 ❏ Community and parent engagement (e.g. dialogue sessions)
 ❏ Reward and punishment
 ❏ Standard creation and goal-setting for schools
 ❏ Allocation of resources
 ❏ Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
What is the underlying motivation for the use of the school report card? 
(You can select multiple answers)
 ❏ Political initiative
 ❏ Local civic group demands
 ❏ School accreditation
 ❏ Decentralization process
 ❏ Link to funding
 ❏ Legislative requirement
 ❏ Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Has the school report card helped improve school management and 
performance, and/or reduce corruption in the education system? If so, 
how?
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What factors affect the effectiveness of the school report card? (You can 
select multiple answers)
 ❏ Capacity of the audiences to act upon information
 ❏ Capacity to produce accurate and timely data
 ❏ Comprehensibility of data (presentation of data)
 ❏ Political will
 ❏ Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Is there a link to a sample of the school report card?
 ❏ Yes (if yes, please provide the URL of the sample below)  . . . . . . . . . . .
 ❏ No
Are there any other comments on school report cards you would like 
to share?
Contact Information
 ❏ Name
 ❏ Organization
 ❏ Email
 ❏ Phone
 ❏ Country
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Brazil:  IDEB 2013
Early years of elementary school
Approval rate Proof Brazil
Year 1 2 3 4 5 P
Mathematics Portuguese Language
NAverage 
proficiency
Standardized 
proficiency
Average 
proficiency
Standardized 
proficiency
2005 - 61.2 90.2 82.4 94.3 0.80 161.8 3.9 149.2 3.6 3.76
2007 - 66.1 67.3 66.7 90.5 0.71 171.7 4.3 161.5 4.1 4.18
2009 - 70.4 72.9 72.9 71.7 0.72 164.5 4.0 152.3 3.8 3.87
2011 - - 85.2 87.1 82.6 0.85 170.8 4.2 146.7 3.6 3.89
2013 - - - - 76.0 0.76 150.4 3.4 150.4 3.7 3.57
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Colombia: School Excellence Report 2015
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Colombia (cont.)
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Colombia (cont.)
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Colombia (cont.)
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Ghana: School Report Card 2011–2012
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Ghana (cont.) 
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Ghana (cont.) 
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Ghana (cont.) 
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Ghana (cont.) 
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Malawi: School performance review – school feedback 
report
Name of school Zone
Date of data collection District
SPR team names
This report summarizes observations made at your school during the 
school performance review visit. We hope it will help you identify strengths 
and weakness in your school. We ask your school to share this report with 
staff, SMC, PTA, and the school community. We invite your school to use 
this and other relevant information to plan for future improvements (i.e. to 
develop or review and implement a School Improvement Plan).
The following points may help you to interpret the table that follows:
• The first column describes the indicators that were used to evaluate the 
school;
• The second column provides an evaluation of performance on a four-
point scale – Fully Achieved, Achieved, Partially Achieved, Not 
Achieved;
• The third column provides the key points of evidence that support the 
overall judgement for each indicator;
• At the end of each category, recommendations for improvement are 
stated.
Evaluation Overview Explanation
Fully achieved Major strengths Performance is characterized by overall strength. 
There are few weaknesses, if any. Such a school could 
be treated as a role model as exemplary to others. 
Achieved Strengths outweigh 
weaknesses
Performance is characterized by a number of 
strengths. There are weaknesses but these do not have 
a significant adverse effect on the school. 
Partially 
achieved
Some important 
weaknesses
There are some strengths, but there are also 
important weaknesses that have a significant effect 
on the school. 
Not achieved Major weaknesses There are major weaknesses that require immediate 
action. These have a very significant negative effect 
on the performance of the school. 
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Malawi (cont.) 
At the end of the report some recommendations are made that will help 
to prioritize your actions for school improvement.
Remember that the District Office, PEA, LCD, and other NGOs are 
all there to assist you with school improvement and that it is important that 
the school community plays a central role in the development and activities 
of the School Improvement Plan. 
INDICATOR EVALUATION EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EVALUATION
Teaching and learning
1.  Resources and 
physical classroom 
environment
Achieved • Well-swept classrooms.
• Most learners seated at desks.
• Most chalkboards are well maintained.
• No learning centres.
2.  Lesson preparation 
and planning
Not achieved • No lesson plan available in most 
classes.
• No evidence of thorough lesson 
preparation.
• Records are not kept up to date.
3. Teaching and 
learning process
Partially achieved • Good relationship between teachers 
and learners.
• Good questioning activities.
• In effective TALULAR.
• Lack of confidence in subject 
knowledge.
4. Classroom 
management
Achieved • Display of class timetables in most 
classrooms.
• Good behaviour promoted.
• Learners are seated orderly.
• Books not distributed to learners.
5. Assessment and 
record keeping
Partially achieved • Learners are praised for correct 
answers.
• Marking of learners written exercises.
• No promotion of homework.
• No attendance registers.
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INDICATOR EVALUATION EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EVALUATION
RECOMMENDATIONS • Have all plans ready before each school day.
• Update attendance registers.
• Distribute the available books to learners.
• Administer homework regularly.
Leadership and management
6. Planning and 
organization
Partially achieved • Availability of SIP.
• School records kept on school premises 
and are easily accessible.
• No minutes of staff meetings.
• School records not updated.
7. Financial 
management 
Partially achieved • SMC monitors expenditure.
• The school has a cashbook.
• Little transparency in financial matters.
• No recruitment of auxiliary teacher 
though there is a need.
8. Management of 
material resources
Achieved • Well-cared for and maintained school 
buildings and grounds.
• Clean and well-maintained school 
latrines.
• Well-protected environment.
• No reliable source of clean and safe 
water.
9. Supervision of 
teaching and learning
Partially achieved • Lessons follow the timetable.
• No monitoring of the assessment.
• No documented classroom observation.
• Availability of master timetable. 
10. Staff deployment 
and development
Partially achieved • Head teacher is involved in teaching.
• Deployment of teachers’ matches with 
training experience.
• No monitoring of staff attendance and 
punctuality.
• Irregular school CPDs.
11. Access, equity, and 
retention
Partially achieved • Guidance and counselling is offered to 
learners.
• Sufficient number of boys’ and girls’ 
latrines that are used effectively.
• No programme to support special needs 
of children.
• Lack of role models.
Malawi (cont.) 
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INDICATOR EVALUATION EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EVALUATION
RECOMMENDATIONS • Plan and conduct regular staff meetings and CPDs.
• Handle financial matters transparently and accountably.
School governance
12. Community 
management of the 
school
Achieved • SMC is adequately trained.
• SMC regularly reports school matters 
to parents.
• SMC monitors financial expenditure.
• Irregular SMC meetings.
13. School-community 
relations
Achieved • High level of meaningful participation 
by community in school planning.
• Community shows great interest in 
school affairs.
• No meaningful fundraising for the 
school.
14. Community support 
for teaching and 
learning
Achieved • Parents are happy with the behaviour 
of the teachers.
• Parents and the community ensure 
that learners stay in school.
• Community accounts for all the school 
funds.
• No action to improve teaching and 
learning.
RECOMMENDATIONS • Come up with plans to recruit auxiliary teachers.
• Revamp mother group.
Child-friendly school
15. Rights-based and 
inclusive school
Achieved • Boys and girls are treated equally.
• Learners are involved in drafting SIP.
• Availability of trusted teacher to give 
confidential advice and support.
• No guidance and counselling by 
mother group.
16. Effective school Achieved • Clean classrooms.
• Regular attendance by teachers.
• Good behaviour by learners.
• Inadequate textbooks.
Malawi (cont.) 
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INDICATOR EVALUATION EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EVALUATION
17. Safe, protective, 
and health-promoting 
school
Partially achieved • Learners are safe when travelling to 
and from school.
• Enough latrines that are clean and 
offer privacy to learners.
• No hand-washing facilities.
• Most learners do not eat in the 
morning.
RECOMMENDATIONS • Insist on hand-washing habit.
• Plan for purchasing additional textbooks in subsequent SIPs.
Overall category of school:  Partially achieved
KEY STRENGTHS TO BUILD ON: 
• Adequate clean latrines.
• Community participation in development projects.
• Availability of woodlot.
• Availability of most records and displays in the head teacher’s office.
3 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:
• Head teacher should ensure regular, adequate, and effective planning 
by all teachers.
• All school stockholders should be involved in SIP drafting 
implementation and monitoring.
• Distribute the available books to learners for use at home.
Signature of receipt 
Head teacher:  .................................................................................................
SMC chair:  ................................... PTA chair: ............................................
SPR team representative: ............................. Date: ..................................
LCD Malawi, 2013
Malawi (cont.) 
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United States: Virginia School Report Card
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United States (cont.) 
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United States (cont.)
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United States (cont.)
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United States (cont.)
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United States (cont.)
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United States (cont.)
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United States (cont.)
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United States (cont.)
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United States (cont.)
(Extract showing results for English reading for Grade  3. The same information is provided for 
Mathematics, Science, History, and Social Science for Grade 3, English reading and Mathematics for 
Grade 4, English reading, English writing, Mathematics and Science for Grade 5, and Mathematics 
for Grade 7.)
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United States (cont.)
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